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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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25 June 1992

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## ALGERIA

### Boudiaf May Run for Presidency; No Dialogue With FIS

*LD1706202892 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic 2200 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Text] [Higher State Council Chairman] Mr Mohamed Boudiaf could be the current regime's nominee in the coming presidential elections. The statement was made by Mr. Aboubakr Belkaid, minister of culture and communications, in a meeting with the foreign press. In that meeting he hinted that there is a strong opportunity for that.

The minister of culture and communications said that these elections could take place before the end of the year if suitable political circumstances are provided. In his meeting with the foreign press, Mr. Aboubakr Belkaid again excluded the possibility of opening a dialogue between the current authorities and the dissolved Islamic Salvation Front [FIS], as is demanded by some opposition parties in the attempt to achieve national reconciliation.

He also denied the existence of a big political initiative to be announced on the 30th anniversary of independence, which will be on 5 July. He said that he does not know anything about such an initiative.

### Negotiations Under Way To Repay Debt to Former USSR

*LD1706181892 Algiers APS in English 1205 GMT 17 Jun 92*

[Text] Algiers, 17/06/92 (APS)—Negotiations are underway between the Algerian Economy Ministry and the Ministry of the Russian External Economic Relations for the payment, by Algerian products, of the external debt contracted before the former USSR.

The project of agreement is in the hands of [word indistinct] inter-state commission for approval, the commercial representative before the Russian Embassy to Algeria indicated during the "Russian Day" organized by the Algerian Confederation of the Employers (CAP).

Considering the weakness of the Algero-Soviet exchanges, the Algerian debt towards the USSR should not go beyond 5 percent of the total external debt estimated at 25 billion dollars.

The Russian representative recalled the meeting of 2 May between the Algerian delegation and the Russian one centered on the payment of the debt. A protocol of agreement was signed on the nomenclature of products to be supplied to Russia, notably pharmaceutical and food products considered as vital for the Russian authorities.

New economic links will be established in conformity with new realities between the two countries, notably between the private sectors of the two countries.

### Security Services Report Nationwide Unrest

*LD1406024592 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic 2200 GMT 13 Jun 92*

[Text] Tension reappears in reports on the security situation. The reference here is to armed demonstrations and bombings, including two of the latter reported in Constantine two nights ago.

Security services detained 15 people in Bousaada District, charged with congregating and inciting to breach peace and civil disobedience. APS reports today that these people attended 'Id al-Adha prayers and then organized a procession across Bousaada's main streets and in Sidi Bel Atar municipality, Mostaganem Province. Unknown assailants fired on and injured a national gendarme.

Tlemcen Province security services report today that four people were taken into Tlemcen court custody after police established their involvement in armed attacks on police elements.

The people's council headquarters at (?Gannas) municipality, Boumerdes Province, also reported incidents. The placard bearing the slogan from the people to the people was set on fire.

The national gendarmerie reports that the badly decomposed body of (Chanouf Hacem), 24, was discovered by residents in (Zabarbar) forest last night. He was thought to be connected with the Islamic Salvation Front and thought to have died from injuries during an engagement with the national gendarmerie on 20 May.

A gas cylinder filled with gunpowder was discovered two days ago on a railway bridge in one of Batna Province's municipalities. The security services rushed to the scene to examine and defuse the object before starting an inquiry.

There were two bombings in Constantine on 11 and 12 June. The security services report that there were no casualties. The two bombs were targeted at the provincial headquarters of the police and the national gendarmerie. The security services said that the two bombs were placed outside the headquarters and caused no material damage even though the sound of the two explosions was very powerful.

### Security Forces Discover Arms, Explosives

*LD1506200392 Algiers ENTV Television Network in Arabic 1900 GMT 15 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] This morning security forces in Algiers Province discovered two arms and explosives caches. Among what was seized were 118 powerful bombs. [passage]

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## NEAR EAST

omitted: video of bombs and explosives seized, voice of security officer giving details of seized items]

**Press Said More Determined Following Violence**

*92AF0897B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French  
4 May 92 p 1*

[Commentary by Ammar I.: "Those Who Believe in Algeria"]

[Text] The night before last, graffiti hostile to ALGER REPUBLICAIN was painted on the outside walls of its premises. Persons unknown, financed by forces somewhat better known, daubed the hateful and threatening graffiti. On the very premises of Press House! The graffiti referred to "microbes to be eliminated..." More than a threat: a death sentence.

Everyone at the paper knows such a "promise" is to be taken seriously. But neither that nor the increasing number of incidents of abuse and telephone threats, nor even the appearance, in certain quarters of Algiers, of small posters signed "FIS" [Islamic Salvation Front] and specifically aimed at ALGER REPUBLICAIN have dampened the dedicated spirit that prevails in the editorial offices.

These acts of intimidation will not undermine our determination to denounce the criminal activities of fundamentalism, to continue exposing the obscurantist, dictatorial, and violent nature of its totalitarian plan for society, unmasking its external ties and its internal machinations.

Our resolve will not weaken, our pen will not waver, our editorial line will not falter. Algeria and its destiny hang in the balance.

With all due respect for the "peacemakers" on all sides, we will continue to demand the total ERADICATION of the political machinery, economic supports, and ideological underpinnings that fostered, developed and instrumentalized the fundamentalist movement as a legal force organized for the purpose of taking power. Because fundamentalism's only platform is...the eradication of the republican state, the annihilation of democracy and its supporters, and the overthrow of all cultural and spiritual values that express the Algerian's uniqueness or his solidarity with the rest of humanity.

The question today is whether Algeria is able to take the essential leap forward to extricate itself from the weight of the coalesced forces of regression and stagnation. An all-out war is under way, with the country's survival at stake. The agitation we are seeing at present—alarmist rumors, a resurgence of terrorist activity, political diversions, and social destabilization—strangely coincides with the firm dispensation of republican justice against the FIS and its terrorist detachments. It also seems to be a response to the government's declared intent to take practical steps to dissolve it. In such a context, forces

loyal to democracy and a modern future for the country—all those who believe in Algeria—have no choice but to remain judicious and determined in their common struggle. Our society needs that to restore its confidence.

**Rationale, Implications of New Oil Strategy**

*92AF0907A Algiers EL WATAN in French  
19, 20 May 92*

[Article by Lahouari Addi of Oran University, guest professor at Princeton University (U.S.A.): "Algeria's New Oil and Gas Strategy"—first two paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]

[19 May pp 11-12]

[Text] In the following paper, presented at the symposium on "The World Oil Market in the Nineties: Toward a New System?" organized by Texas University at Austin on 24-25 April, Mr. Lahouari Addi of Oran University and professor at Princeton University, analyzes the new data of Algeria's oil and gas policy.

The current government's line, which reflects the seventies' search for social compromise, is to push for a production increase and a significant mobilization of resources.

As the price of a barrel of oil fluctuates from week to week, from month to month, the world oil market remains a mystery that defies any forward-looking analysis. But the market does not seem to obey solely factors reflecting economic conditions. It also constantly undergoes structural changes, which would be better studied in the context of a history of the world oil and gas market.

In fact, an analyst comparing the sixties, seventies, eighties, and nineties, would have to account for changes in the balance of power between producers and consumers, which have recurred since the late sixties. I am not referring to price fluctuations in real terms and, in view of worldwide inflation and the deterioration of the terms of trade, it would be no surprise if these prices remained relatively stable despite the disruptions of formal market conditions. In this paper, I would attempt to explain the change in Algeria's oil and gas policy. Algeria is an interesting example to the extent that, in the seventies, its government expressed and formalized a veritable nationalist raw-material doctrine for Third World countries. Today, however, it is forced to give up that doctrine because it is grappling with the contradictions of the distributive economy that characterizes the rentier state.

**1. The Nationalist Raw-Material Doctrine and Its Obsolescence**

The most striking is the change of attitude of exporting countries, the boldest of which strongly affirmed in the seventies their determination to control world oil and gas price-setting mechanisms, a determination that some

countries wished to extend to all the Third World's exports of raw materials to developed countries. During the seventies, a nationalist raw-material doctrine emerged, the main lines of which were expressed in President H. Boumediene's speech at the special UN session on raw materials. Organized by the United Nations in April 1973 at the request of Third World countries, this session established the right of Third World countries to nationalize their mineral raw materials. Through this principle, which the international community then recognized as legitimate and legal, Third World raw-material exporters wanted mostly to control the world price-setting mechanisms and make the most of them to finance their development needs. Based on this doctrine, which prevailed during the seventies, exporting countries altered the balance of power that, until then, had been unfavorable to them.

Until 1985, oil exporting countries, many of whom belonged to OPEC, were in a position to push oil prices upward, and they did so. Certainly, OPEC members' interests sometimes diverged. Being the political allies of consumer countries, large exporters (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.) were concerned not to undermine the world economy through excessively high oil prices, all the more so as, having smaller populations, these countries did not need considerable financial resources to industrialize. Conversely, Iran, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, etc., were striving for maximum prices in order to sustain their planned industrial development efforts.

Nevertheless, a few years later, the world oil and gas market changed to such an extent that legal possession of deposits was no longer enough to set world oil prices. The factors that did away with the independent setting of prices are bound to be discussed in other papers at this symposium, and I shall not dwell on them. I shall mention only the start of production in non-OPEC countries and the creation of the IEA (International Energy Agency), a veritable counter-OPEC, which worked out an efficient inventory strategy, thus neutralizing any attempt at price increases.

Within a few years, legal ownership of oil wells was no longer enough to set world market prices. Algeria or Iran might legally own their oil and gas; they might control 51 or 100 percent of the boards of companies operating on their soil, but they were no longer in a position to push world market prices upward. Under these new conditions, the nationalist raw-material doctrine became obsolete; worse, it even became a handicap for exporting countries without the financial and technological resources required to continue exploration and to set new wells into production. This is how we must understand the statement made by Sid-Ahmed Ghozali immediately after he was appointed prime minister, saying that he was ready to sell 25 percent of Hassi Messaoud to foreign companies. This statement caused quite a stir in the local press because it challenged two symbols. First, Hassi Messaoud represents the determination affirmed on 24 February 1971 (when foreign companies were nationalized) to own national resources and use them for

development. Secondly, the author of the statement had been for a long time the chief executive officer of SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons], the instrument of this nationalization.

## 2. New Legal Provisions

Apart from this breach of symbols, S.A. Ghozali's statement expressed the limitations of the nationalist raw-material doctrine as well as a pressing need for new financial resources to solve the serious economic, social, and political crisis that affected Algeria. Entirely (98 percent) dependent on oil and gas exports, Algeria has an average budget of \$12 billion per year. It must repay \$7-8 billion per year to service its foreign debt, and it must import the equivalent of \$7-8 billion in food and manufactured products for its industry. Hence an annual deficit of \$3-4 billion.

The government considered that only 10 percent of the Sahara had been explored so far, saying that 15 wells were being drilled every year, whereas the world average is 90 wells per year. Therefore, it opted for an intensive oil and gas development strategy; but this new strategy requires fresh financial resources that only foreign companies can provide. SONATRACH estimates the required research and development effort at \$5 billion over the next 10 years. Setting into production the wet-gas deposits already discovered but not yet developed will require some \$5 billion between now and 1998. As for the recovery of known reserves—an estimated 450 million tons—it will require \$5 billion. All in all, this new intensive development strategy will require \$15 billion in foreign financing; it might bring in \$6-7 billion in the immediate future, and \$50 billion until the year 2000.

The government, therefore, is thinking of increasing oil and gas production, for which it needs financial help from foreign companies. But the 1986 oil code discourages any foreign investment. Therefore, a decision was made to alter legislative provisions in order to be able to attract foreign companies. The preamble to the new law passed by the National Assembly in November 1991 states (item 4): "The mobilization of our own resources to face our debt and to revive productive investment, as well as the desire to facilitate negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of foreign companies' participation in improving the recovery rate of reserves currently being developed, may lead us to grant these companies a limited, and at any rate a minority interest in current production over a period and under conditions to be determined." To attract foreign companies, the new law introduced the following changes:

1. Extension of the provisions applying to liquid oil products to include gas.
2. Extension of foreign companies' participation in the development of discovered as well as current deposits.

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3. Modification of the tax policy to provide additional incentive, with the possibility of tax allowances as far as royalties and income tax are concerned, in order to direct research efforts toward neglected areas.

4. Introduction of international arbitration to settle any conflicts that might arise between Sonatrach and its partners.

The amendment introduced by the government therefore supersedes article 65 of the law of August 1986, which did not allow foreign partners to acquire an interest in deposits discovered before 1986. Claiming that he is not implementing a new policy contrary to the nationalist raw-material doctrine, the minister of energy, Mr. Noredine Ait-Laoussine, attempted to convince skeptical deputies that this was a new oil and gas strategy rather than a new oil and gas policy. He explained that the objectives of this strategy are essentially to revive the exploration effort and the effort to expand discovered deposits, as well as to improve the recovery rate of known reserves.

The Algerian Government does not believe that it is renegeing on past commitments. It considers that it is adapting to a new situation. Talking to American oilmen, the minister of energy, Mr. Noredine Ait-Laoussine explained that his government's change of oil and gas strategy was the result of changes in the world market. The following excerpt from his paper is explicit enough:

"A few months ago, when I proposed to our Parliament to 'denationalize' Algeria's gas reserves and to privatize the mining industry, I was well aware that 20 years before, together with some of my colleagues in the government, I had supported the very measures I was now proposing to abolish. What we did 20 years ago, and what we are doing now serves the same objective, namely to create the conditions required to trigger the economic development that will benefit Algerians. Twenty years ago, foreign companies had such tight control over Algeria's natural resources that they were in a position to stifle national interest. Moreover, our national company did not have enough experience to negotiate with international companies without being handicapped. Therefore, nationalization was the logical move required by the situation. Today, the situation has changed. Algeria legally owns its natural resources and SONATRACH has gained more maturity. But we recognize that we lack financial resources and that we do not have the human and technological resources to fulfill our ambitions." (PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, 9 March 1992).

#### Economic Reforms and Deregulation of the Oil Sector

Therefore, deregulation of the oil and gas sector is not a political choice. It is a strategic necessity resulting from a lack of financial resources. Algeria has implemented a distributive economy that calls for increasing financial resources. It is a rather good illustration of the law of the perversion of economic development through oil and gas

income. From the moment it gained independence, in 1962, Algeria stated its determination to mobilize its raw material resources in the service of development. It did not use its oil and gas income to import luxury items, nor to purchase weapons beyond what its defense required. Most of its oil and gas income was used to set up an industrial apparatus which, unfortunately, has been dependent on State subsidies from the start. The social and political situation now depends on the balance between the respective levels of the overall deficit of state-owned businesses and oil and gas income. The model gets in a crisis as soon as oil and gas income becomes inadequate to cover the deficit and its effects. The industrial apparatus that was set up entails a considerable social demand.

However, from the economic point of view, this demand is artificial insofar as it does not have a value counterpart in production. Until the mid-eighties, this social demand was met by imports financed by oil and gas income. When world prices dropped, in 1985-1986, Algeria no longer had the financial resources required to meet the social demand. To solve the problem, the government would have to choose one of two policies.

The first one would be to undertake structural reforms of the economic apparatus so as to render it efficient and capable of creating new wealth. The social demand would be met by the excess value created by profitable businesses.

#### [20 May p 9]

[Text] Such a reform, however, is not easy to implement because it implies an alignment with international competition, which means that many businesses will fail. No political regime would survive the social consequences of such a reform. Since 1986, successive governments have attempted to submit the public sector to the logic of the price system, edicting many laws and regulations to force state-owned companies to become financially independent. But they all failed because no government could apply the logic of the price system to state-owned companies. The objective of this reform was to put an end to the rentier state, since it no longer had the financial resources required to meet the demands placed on it. But the governments do not seem to have recognized the difficulties of such a task.

The second approach would consist in maintaining economic structures as they are—with all the resulting deficits of enterprises and as a booster of social demand—and to rely on increased oil and gas exports. This solution would renew the social compromise of previous years, with a redistribution of wealth by the rentier state, although officially still stressing the need for regulation through the laws of the market.

Before going further, I would like to make a digression to define the concept of distributive economy. Distributive economy is not an economy in which the State engages in a policy of support for the destitute strata of society. It is

not the "Welfare State" that remedies distribution inadequacies by a social protection network: unemployment allowances, health care, education, transportation... In distributive economy, there is also no free distribution of products or "stamps" for destitute individuals. Distributive economy is not a less inequalitarian or less unfair way to organize the economy. Distribution in a distributive economy is still more unfair than in other production systems. Distributive economy is characterized essentially by a discrepancy between production and distribution. Moreover, you should not believe that workers are the "beneficiaries" of a distributive economy.

Actually, while distributing wages that do not reflect actual production and are increasingly depreciated by inflation, distributive economy also gives rise to huge private fortunes that do not reflect the creation of new wealth either. Bureaucratic mechanisms lead to the appearance of "artificial" wealth, which upsets currency exchange rates as well as price relations, and cuts off the national economy from international dynamic trends.

#### Deficit and Social Peace

In Algeria, the rentier state's redistribution occurs through business deficits, i.e., distribution is not in direct proportion to production. Businesses continue to operate not because they are making profits, but because they fulfill a political and social function. They distribute salaries not as the monetary counterparts of new production, but as a way of achieving social peace though their exchange for imported food products, some of which are subsidized. Yet, we cannot put an end to the rentier state by sacrificing those it has supported until now. Economic reform could succeed only if new jobs were created to maintain a socially and politically bearable employment level. Economic reform failed because the government did not implement a credible alternative to the rentier state, in particular for the social strata that the reform was going to hurt. Absorbing the deficit of state-owned businesses means that employment will decline; it also means that demand will be cut back, as required by the IMF. But cutting back the demand in an underdeveloped country often leads to starving entire population categories that are economically weak. This solution also involves political risks of instability and anarchy. In Algeria, such a situation would directly benefit the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], which might take over through the street. This is why the Ghozali government has chosen the second policy, which is easier to carry out, and the only one likely to succeed in the short term. (This would explain Mr. Mouloud Hamrouche, the previous prime minister's animosity against the present prime minister, who has chances to succeed). Presenting his program to the National Assembly the day after his appointment, in July 1991, the prime minister, Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghozali, stated:

"The scope of Algeria's problems is measured by the considerable discrepancy that exists, on the one hand, between the needs resulting from the people's social

demand and their desire to become modern and, on the other hand, the production level resulting from the tragically inadequate mobilization of material and human resources. Cutting back needs can be only a temporary answer. But if we want to speak of a solution, there is no alternative to a production increase and a significant mobilization of resources. A production increase and the development and control of the corresponding processes are a long-term matter, which in no case should be expected to solve our problems. On the other hand, as far as resources are concerned, our country possesses an asset that can be decisive, I mean its mining resources, in particular oil and gas." (Government Program, Prime Minister's Office, Algiers, July 1991, pp 25-26.)

The Ghozali government appears determined to pursue this second approach to the end in order to be able to retain the mechanisms of the rentier state, in a crisis since 1986. The government's new oil and gas strategy, illustrated by regulatory changes, is in line with the search for social compromise of the seventies. In his answers to deputies' questions, the prime minister blamed the economic crisis neither on the poor performance of state-owned businesses, nor on the 1985 fall of world oil and gas prices. His explanation resuscitates the old debate of the late seventies, on the advisability of intensive development of mining resources. Listen to him:

"Problems started in 1985. And we must say that, contrary to what people were saying, these problems were not due to the collapse of oil and gas prices. They were the result of the dismantling of natural gas export contracts in 1979-1980, which deprived and is still depriving the country of several billion dollars each year, i.e., over U.S.\$40 billion to date." (Government Program)

In other words, for the prime minister the low profitability of businesses and the low productivity of labor and equipment would not be problems per se if the State had the financial means to ignore them, or the financial means to "neutralize" the depreciation of the currency and the loss of purchasing power it entails. They would be problems only because the State does not have the means to "conceal" them through imports and redistribution. This reflects a "rentier" logic, feeding the rentier state, which gets in a crisis as soon as the level of external resources diminishes. To survive, the rentier state needs external financial resources to ensure the free flow of its redistribution mechanisms that form the basis of the social compromise—emoluments and bonuses for some, "political" salaries for others, and imported-product price support for everybody. The social unrest that has been perturbing Algeria since October 1988 is caused by the crisis of the rentier state, because the latter is characterized by an interdependence and articulation of interests from the top to the base of the social hierarchy according to a logic of redistribution, even though redistribution might be nonegalitarian.

## NEAR EAST

**The Rentier State and Its Contradictions**

We shall have to explain why oil and gas exporting countries are experiencing such serious economic crises despite their significant financial resources. The explanation is to be found in the rentier state's characteristics and contradictions. To the extent that the value of oil and gas income is not created by local work, this income is artificial. The income levels of oil and gas exporting countries do not reflect their actual development. The oil and gas income represents the transfer of value created elsewhere. To understand and explain the vulnerability of oil and gas exporting countries, we shall have to bear in mind this fundamental assumption of traditional economy. I know that this truth is hard to hear, even in Texas, a land whose wealth is to a large extent based on oil, but this truth is still harsher for my country, where it has led to tragic developments.

I shall borrow the concept of rentier state from H. Bablewi and G. Luciano, whose book bearing the significant title, "The Rentier State" (Grom Helm, London, New York, 1987) is a great help with our problems.

The analysis of the rentier state made in this book stresses the basic fact that the income involved is of external origin. This premise is important because, if the income were of internal origin—as was the case in the European feudal state—this would suppose the existence of a value-creating local mechanism. In this case, the income considered would be a mere transfer of value within a national economic community. The comparison, suggested but not explicitly developed by H. Bablewi and G. Luciano, between the rentier state and the feudal state is methodologically useful. From the economic point of view, the wealth considered is not renewable in one case (oil and gas) and renewable in the other case (agriculture). From the political point of view, the feudal state model contains the germs of its obsolescence, while the rentier state model is self-contained.

Because wealth is created by local productive forces, in the feudal model, the distribution parameters may be changed. This possibility for change involves a potential dynamic trend challenging the domination of the rentier social strata. The situation is quite different in the rentier state model, where the government, which legally owns oil and gas wells, is using a minority of workers to develop and transport oil and gas.

From this development, the State derives wealth that enables it to secure the majority's civil obedience, as the majority has an immediate interest in redistributive economy. The model per se does not contain the prospects of its obsolescence. Following redistribution crises, rebellions may occur and may bring about a change of regime or government, but they will not put an end to the rentier state model itself.

**Perverse Income**

The availability of financial resources provided by oil and gas exports makes it possible not to face up to social

and political contradictions. These financial resources will be used solely to make these contradictions bearable and to hide them. This raises the question of whether oil and gas income can generate economic development—whether it is an asset or a handicap. The question deserves being asked if we compare Southeast Asian economies (South Korea, Taiwan, etc.) with oil-producing countries such as Libya, Mexico, Iraq, Iran, Algeria... In the latter countries, oil and gas income has perverted development, it has blocked it, essentially because that income did not have economic status. Oil and gas income was not used as an exchange value inserted into the international economic structure. It was used as a usage value, social wealth destroyed through consumption. It derived this purpose from its political status, which prevented it from being productive capital facing international competition.

This means, in conclusion, that as long as oil and gas income is available, the temptation will be great not to face the implacable logic of the market, production and competition.

The extinction of the rentier state will occur only when the oil and gas income on which it feeds becomes extinct. Economically, the "facilities" provided by oil and gas income are an obstacle to regulation through market laws. Politically, as it makes society dependent on the government, the availability of such income is again an obstacle to democratization and to the changeover of political power between parties. Thus, the sole concern of oil strategies, past and present, has been and will remain to adjust the level of the rentier state's financial needs to legal modes of oil and gas development. Yesterday, this adjustment had to be made against foreign companies, today it must be made with them.

**International 'Trotskyite' Group Criticizes 'Oppression'**

*92AF0911A Algiers EL WATAN in French  
24 May 92 pp 1,3*

[Article by Abderrezak Merad: "The Trotskyites Pull Out All Stops"]

[Text] The international Trotskyite movement has been targeting Algeria in recent days. In France and Switzerland, rallies are held and leaflets are distributed to protest "the interruption of the democratic process." Hostility toward the Algerian Government is being cultivated in those countries with an intensity rarely seen. At an unusually animated rally in Paris, Louisa Hanoune—especially invited for the occasion—made it a point of honor to decry the "sham" in Algeria. In Geneva, Moroccan students stepped up the defamation campaign by handing out unusually vicious leaflets in front of university buildings, calling for "an end to the repression in Algeria." How extraordinarily ironic for Moroccans to lecture about democracy and freedom to Swiss citizens using Algeria as a pretext, while their own country has many improvements to make in its human

rights record. Moreover, these Trotskyite activists known for their anti-Algerian fervor, although not representative of the entire movement, are informed by the Workers' Party led by Louisa Hanoune who opted to move her "struggle for democracy" to foreign soil where the media are eager for sensational stories about faltering democracies in developing countries and fundamentalism in sensitive Muslim regions like Algeria.

In Geneva, the "documents" used by the Trotskyites in their campaign, following the recommendations of their "International," are fraught with false information. One example is the list of names of journalists supposedly under arrest. Among those listed are Djamel Eddine Fahassi, Rachid Hamou, Kamel Belkacem, and Zoubir Souissi.

In reality, none of them is in detention. That is an indication of the Trotskyites' lack of scruples in their effort to paint another image of Algeria.

This is not the first action of its kind by Moroccan students abroad, particularly in Europe. A few months ago in Brussels, they distributed leaflets containing personal attacks against Boudiaf shortly after he was named to head the High Committee of State. The Moroccan students circulated a text asserting that Boudiaf may be a member of a Masonic lodge.

This operation appears to be part of a far-reaching plan to seize every opportunity to discredit Algeria's attempts to reassure its European partners. Along those lines, there is the curious example of the protest to Algeria's ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Abdelhamid Semichi, by a "delegation of the Swiss sponsorship and solidarity fund" on 9 April.

The delegation was "greatly disturbed by the situation in Algeria and by poor conditions of detention, while arrests are estimated to number 50,000." Our ambassador responded as follows: "Algeria is not averse to cooperating with human rights groups. We have always been open with nongovernmental organizations. Algeria, too, intervened with regard to Iraq. You want to help improve the situation in Algeria. You are valid interlocutors and we welcome interest in human rights."

"If you have followed events in Algeria closely, you know that pluralism exists. And while there were many arrests, the government made no secret of it. It did not hide the figures and it gave an explanation. The arrests have been limited to members of fundamentalist groups and they were made in order to ensure the country's stability."

"But you speak of hundreds dead and injured. From what you have written, one might equate Algeria with certain Latin American countries of the 1970's. Of the 7,000 persons arrested, 97 percent were fundamentalists in a position to destabilize the country. There are no expedited trials; in fact, most often, there are no trials. You are confusing a specific case, with which I am not familiar, and a particular situation about which the government has already spoken. Those who lecture us

must understand that we cannot tolerate a political party that vows to institute Islamic law and abolish the democratic process, if it comes to power. Such lecturing may be well intentioned, but it overlooks Algerian realities—specifically, to allow the current process of liberalization to continue."

"I agreed to meet with you for two reasons: first, because you are a private Swiss organization and, second, to inform you of the Algerian point of view. If there is an injustice to be corrected, we shall do so. I do not refuse to work with you to improve the situation. All young people under 18 years of age have been systematically freed. There are no minors, women, or old people in detention. If injustices have occurred, you are right to point them out."

Following the stir created by the recent meeting in Madrid on democracy in Algeria, other attempts are being made to prevent the new Algerian Government from informing the outside world of what is actually happening there. There is no question about the Trotskyites' hand in that effort.

**Writer's Perception on FIS Victory, Social Issues**  
*92AF0891A Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French*  
*26 May 92 pp 8-9*

[Interview with Rachid Mimouni in Paris by Zahia Yahia; date not given: "Algerians Have Need"—first four paragraphs are LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] After Rachid Boudjedra's explosive book on the Islamist movement and certain practices of the regime, we now have the "other" Rachid—Mimouni—casting a baleful eye on recent Algerian history.

In "De la barbarie en general et de l'intégrisme en particulier" [On Barbarism in General and Fundamentalism in Particular], published recently in Paris, Mimouni offers an interesting framework of analysis for understanding the emergence, development and influence of the fundamentalist movement in Algeria.

Without sentimentality, the author outlines the conditions that allowed Abassi Madani's party to dominate the contemporary political scene.

He does not yield, however, to the temptation of invective and insult for which Boudjedra has been widely criticized. In this interview conducted by Zahia Yahia, Mimouni also discusses dispassionately the delicate issues of Algerian political morality, women and fundamentalism, the security camps, etc.

[Yahia] You paint the grimdest possible picture of Algeria; given your skepticism, one might ask why you have not abandoned that country like so many other intellectuals. What makes you "hang on"?

[Mimouni] Like a majority of Algerians, it is love—passion—for my country.

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[Yahia] A majority of Algerians?

[Mimouni] Yes...a very great majority... There are nihilists, people with suicidal tendencies, but I think fundamentally they are very much in the minority... I think most Algerians want to see their country develop, advance, see their incomes increased and problems attenuated. This is a passion shared by a majority of Algerians. It is what inspires me, what impels me to fight, write, and try to do what I can.

[Yahia] You deplored the success of the fundamentalists of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] and you fight for democracy, tolerance. But in your book you make a strange concession: "The fundamentalists must renounce their totalitarian project and admit that coreligionists who do not share their convictions have the right to live in the same country and express themselves freely. Democrats must accept the principle of majority rule and the possibility of an Islamist government."

[Mimouni] If we share a set of values that constitute democracy, this means that in addition to representation, whatever group gets a majority can govern the country. The problem is to establish a consensus between democrats, modernists and fundamentalists to establish a minimal foundation for coexistence.

I have my ideas, and I defend them in my writings, but even so I don't claim to have a monopoly on truth... I respect the opinions of others, of those who think differently.

Remember Voltaire's famous phrase: "I don't agree with your ideas, but I will defend to the death your right to express them."

[Yahia] Even when those ideas amount to the suppression by violence, by murder, of anyone who doesn't want an Islamic republic?

[Mimouni] I completely disagree with the fundamentalist ideology. I consider it a return to barbarism, obscurantism, archaism.

[Yahia] So why should one respect the point of view of "visionaries" who want to plunge the country back into chaos?

[Mimouni] Because as a democrat I am obligated to admit that if a majority express themselves in favor of a fundamentalist movement, the government must be put in their hands...on condition that they respect the rules that made it possible for them to come to power, the rules of democracy, alternation...but they must leave peacefully if they lose their majority, and they must show tolerance.

[Yahia] Do you think they're capable of it?

[Mimouni] Why not? They must tolerate those who think differently, respect their fundamental freedoms, not institute popular tribunals and not conduct inquisitions.

Overall, this is what I try to say: If the fundamentalists accept the existence of others, accept the fact that people may have different ideas, and they become the majority, I say, Why not? We will have to go through an unhappy experience, but if that is what the majority wants, why not? On condition we can be assured they will depart when they lose their majority.

This is not an acceptance of fundamentalist ideology.

[Yahia] It's worse: It's between illusion and resignation; it's "steeped" in fatalism.

[Mimouni] It is nothing but respect for the rules of the democratic game, so long as the fundamentalists themselves accept them.

[Yahia] You speak of respect for the wishes of the majority, and you write that "the Islamists represent 25 percent of the public." Well?

[Mimouni] Twenty-five percent is one-fourth of the population. That's the figure we got after the first round of the legislative elections, but a representation system can translate that 25 percent into a majority in the Assembly: That's the difference. I mean that when they got 25 percent, we knew they were headed for a majority in the Assembly. The representation system is certainly open to serious criticism. But you have to have some system, since democracy must find expression in some form of voting.

[Yahia] What's your view of the decisions and actions of the High Committee of State [HCE]?

[Mimouni] I think we must take it one step at a time... Our previous leaders brought us to a no-win dilemma, where our only choices were the fundamentalists or the army. The mistake made by all three of them (Editor's note: Ben Bella, Boumediene and Chadli Bendjedid) was to have countenanced terrorism. Today, any leader who comes to power must proceed by stages. The first step—which I approve, despite my misgivings—is dismantling the entire terrorist structure that flourished overtly and publicly. It was Chadli's laxity... Everyone knew terrorist groups were forming. The arms caches discovered all over the place were proof of that. They don't date back to the arrival of Boudiaf! And this means the fundamentalists were clearly intent on coming to power, whether by democratic means or by terrorism...there is no other explanation for an overt, legally constituted political party creating arms caches. They were making preparations to shift to armed struggle in the event the democratic process worked against them. This is clear... We all knew the Islamic Salvation Front was an agglomeration of disparate elements: Some were seeking respectability, but hovering about them were small groups that preached violence as a means of coming to power... It was necessary to purge that agglomeration and eradicate the terrorist activity, because violence is unacceptable in politics. You can debate ideas but not kill people. So the HCE's first step seems to me a necessity. But I say so

with reluctance, for I don't believe people should be put in security centers. They should be put in prisons!

[Yahia] There is no more room in the prisons! Extraordinary situations call for extraordinary measures, do they not?

[Mimouni] Let the government work it out, it's their problem... These security centers are embarrassingly reminiscent of concentration camps, and I cannot in good conscience accept them. The government still has all sorts of unsuspected means at its disposal and could certainly find decent prisons. Repression is not enough. Demoralized and desperate Algerians must be shown solutions. They must be shown a way out, and we are not doing it. The hour is late.

[Yahia] What would be the way out—another PAP [expansion not given] but this time with a problem-solving agenda?

[Mimouni] Our leaders must be able to show us some ideas for the future. I think they have not really understood this... It's not enough to try to get the economy back on track. It is absolutely essential to offer Algerians a goal, give them hope. An old proverb says: "If you want to go in a straight line, follow a star." It takes a very long-range vision to motivate people in the here and now, and so far the current regime hasn't provided this.

[Yahia] Speaking of the late President Boumediene, you write: "This austere, self-educated man preferred the objectivity of statistics to the immediacy of reality. His ministers, who understood him very well, showered him with statistics, and if Belaid Abdesslam, the industry minister, became the most influential among them, it was because he supplied him with so many figures."

[Mimouni] It was completely dishonest, and I know this because I saw it at close hand. Each minister relied on the figures of the other to inflate his own. Obviously, when Boumediene read the statistics, he was tremendously impressed. Industrial growth of 7 percent per year in the 1970's: It was marvelous.

[Yahia] One of the highest growth rates in the world—and not just a fantasy, because we find it in all the studies of Algerian industry.

[Mimouni] Yes...because both Algerian and foreign economists used the same figures, the same data, whereas everyone knew the country's economic system was a joke, because people went about their business knowing full well it wasn't true. Boumediene believed it, because he was totally cut off from the realities of the country; and since the press was controlled, who was going to challenge him?

[Yahia] And the opposition parties?

[Mimouni] What opposition parties? They were so small. The only one that could survive was the communists, but he had very cleverly co-opted them. He was so far out of

touch he began spouting gibberish. I remember him promising that by 1980 there wouldn't be a single jobless Algerian.

[Yahia] You write, "Agriculture was completely neglected. Factories were built on fallow land. Turning from the plow, peasants ended up in industrial plants"—as if the industrial plan had no relation to agriculture, and as if it were responsible for the reduction of arable land, for the failure of agriculture.

[Mimouni] The industrial plan was not only utopian, it was stupid... The pity is, the technocrats knew a catastrophe was in the making, but the system was such that people who wanted to keep their jobs could not say no, could not point out that this theory of industry-generating industries was moronic. People felt strongly this was so, but they had no right to speak up. So we had a situation where the numbers were being inflated and each ministry was producing reports saying it had created so many jobs, built so many factories, improved productivity, etc. These figures were utterly fantastic, or at least grossly exaggerated...

[Yahia] In sum, we had power-mad presidents surrounded by incompetents prepared to do anything to hold onto their perquisites?

[Mimouni] Generally speaking, that's the way it was; at least that was the way the system worked under Boumediene. And these things were done. In the Chadli era, we had the reverse, with the increase in oil prices...

[Yahia] You wrote this passage to express your concerns about women in Algeria: "What is barbaric (on the part of the FIS) is the attempt to reduce women to a sub-human condition." But then in July 1990 (just after the FIS victory in the legislatives) you said: "Only a few shopgirls are actually suffering from that terrible fear that the foreign press says is hanging over Algerian women... In reality, the women one meets going about the streets of Algiers without hidjab seem to the contrary more confident than ever..." Why this reversal? Do you regret having offended women who don't want to live in "subhuman conditions" with those remarks of yours that provoked a response from the Association for the Triumph of Women's Rights?

[Mimouni] I know I have taken a lot of criticism over those statements, but you have to put them in context...

[Yahia] It still doesn't reflect well on you.

[Mimouni] Permit me... I meant to say that the French and Western press in general were not reporting the reality of events in Algeria. Their correspondents install themselves in the El-Djazair hotel and interview people in the vicinity. That hotel is in the richest quarter of Algiers, so the journalists are talking to people who are not even representative of Algiers, much less Algeria.

I was actually speaking of those shopgirls one sees around the hotel and its environs, and they are very far

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from being representative of Algeria and Algerian women. They dream only of Paris, Geneva, and places like that.

[Yahia] So?

[Mimouni] I tell you, I sometimes ask myself if they are really living in Algeria. In my book, I don't defend women on principle.

[Yahia] A pity.

[Mimouni] Neither on principle, nor on humanitarian grounds. I don't defend women as such. But I say it is unacceptable to oppress any individual, any human being, in any way, regardless of whether it is based on the fact one is small or large, black, a woman, or whatever. It's absolutely scandalous. I defend women because fundamentalism is so hostile to them. I know that women would have been the first target of a fundamentalist regime, and I cannot accept the idea of women being oppressed because of their sex, simply because they are female...

[Yahia] How do the fundamentalists react to your writings?

[Mimouni] The FIS people are against culture. They don't read writers or playwrights. For them, culture is an offense to religion... They have never read us, they have only heard talk about us. In their view, creative people are unbelievers.

[Yahia] Because they compete with God?

[Mimouni] Exactly. More than unbelievers, they are sinners, to be rejected root and branch. We have seen the FIS stop artistic exhibitions, close cinemas down, etc. Many of us have been sentenced to death in the mosques.

[Yahia] Have you already been rebuked?

[Mimouni] Rebuked, no. The fundamentalists don't like to talk to us.

[Yahia] Because they have no arguments?

[Mimouni] Exactly. They start from the idea that they represent the word of God, the voice of truth, that all who think differently from them are in error and must be put back on the right path... So no discussion is possible. So they are unable to rebuke us.

As soon as one tries to establish a basis for discussion, they reject it... This is Algeria's tragedy: The fundamentalists refuse to engage in dialogue with the democrats—they reject them.

[Yahia] They say it's the democrats who reject dialogue, while you dream of coexistence.

[Mimouni] Personally, I have often tried to start up a dialogue... We thought, let's try at least to listen to each other, so we can coexist, since we are living in the same country. But when they promise to kill us after taking

power, no further discussion is possible. What kind of basis for dialogue could we have? In the end, one sees that we simply can't understand each other at all. They start from the principle that we are in error... and they would have "rectified" us one way or another, whether by propaganda, violence or coercion.

[Yahia] Are you still in danger?

[Mimouni] Even more so, I think. We are in the grip of terrorism, and the book will not help protect me.

[Yahia] You want Algerians to hear your voice, but you publish in France.

[Mimouni] I want Algerians to hear my voice, but I must deal with the realities of the publishing industry. I would have been delighted to have the book published in Algeria, but I would have had to wait three years. There was a crisis, and the book needed to appear very quickly. We are accused of being more interested in communicating to the French and the West. We are accused of being partial to France. That's completely absurd. We write in French, but there's nothing criminal about that. We are dealing with objective realities. Is it better for an Algerian intellectual to express himself in French or to say nothing?

[Yahia] The French media are concerned about the "return in force" of censorship in Algeria. Do you share their concern?

[Mimouni] Not at all. The press is completely free, and we really must pay tribute to the journals and the journalists. They are extremely critical of the government. It is true that some threats hang over them: I hope that doesn't last long... It is completely false to say censorship has returned, since a group of newspapers that can be described as free or independent (whichever you like) has a freedom of tone found nowhere else in the Arab world.

### Book Extracts

The following are extracts from "De la barbarie en general et de l'intégrisme en particulier" by Rachid Mimouni, published by Le Preau Clercs, Paris, April 1992:

### Family Code

There was an urgent need to promulgate a family code defining the rights of married partners and property rights. The first attempt, concocted in 1966, was so scandalous that Boumediene refused to have anything to do with it. In 1972, a second version was also a non-starter. In 1984, Chadli, whose inconsistencies were notorious, and who as we will see was trying to appease the fundamentalists, agreed to sign an even more retrograde law.

This miserable law not only codified the harshest Islamic constraints on women, but also supplemented them with several revolting measures.

For example, a divorced woman, even one who has custody of the children, has no right to remain in the conjugal home. This might seem innocuous enough, but in Algeria there is such a housing shortage that it's impossible to obtain an apartment without a 10-year wait. For a woman, typically impoverished, with no job skills and encumbered with children, it would take a miracle. Her only recourse will be to return to her parents. Implicitly blamed for not having taken care of her husband, she will be as welcome as the plague. Bereft of status and future, she will become the household servant of those who live under the same roof.

#### Culture

Like all populist movements, fundamentalism is the enemy of intellectuals and culture.

Its rhetoric appeals to emotion rather than reason, to instinct rather than intelligence.

The fundamentalists say art must rejected in favor of religion. All intellectual activity must be devoted to deepening one's understanding of the divine message. Any form of creativity is seen as heretical, as a sinful attempt to compete with God. The Islamist social blueprint thus calls explicitly for suppressing all forms of artistic expression: literature, theater, music and of course painting.

Even religious songs dedicated to the glory of the Prophet and Islam are suspect, since they are accompanied by a few monotonous chords on the lute.

#### Sports

The fundamentalists do not even look kindly on sports, including soccer, despite its immense popularity. Where the fundamentalists controlled the APWs (regional councils), they canceled several stadium construction projects. When these actions drew protests, they said they intended to use the money for housing construction for the millions of families huddled in the shanty towns. It was a powerful argument, since the majority of fans in the bleachers come from these insalubrious settlements. But these unfortunates had no way of knowing that no public or private construction companies would carry out these building programs as their contracts required.

Although the Islamists, after several unfortunate experiments, accepted the need to treat sports with kid gloves, they still take a dim view of girls being seen [i.e., unveiled] in the stands. Hassiba Boulmerka, Algeria's only world champion, was criticized for showing her thighs to hundreds of millions of televiewers during the most recent Tokyo games.

#### 'Trabendo'

The Islamic Salvation Front decided early on to control part of this traffic. Aid money from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Libya and Iran—real dollars, poured out by various Islamic banks, leagues and religious associations—lands in banks established in Europe

(France, Italy, Spain and Belgium). The "trabendists", recruited from the ranks of the jobless in large cities, are advanced the fare for the airplane ticket and enough hard-currency savings to qualify for a visa. Once they arrive in European cities, they are given lodgings and taken under the wing of an agent, who gives them some more money. They go about their business and after two or three days return to the airport. Sometimes they are also given items previously acquired for Algerian businessmen who loathe traveling and get these goods delivered to their homes. Naturally, these latter are de facto allies of the FIS. How could these businessmen, who for three decades have endured the prying control procedures of Finance Ministry agents, fail to support those who offer them free trade and the end of price controls?

#### Riadh el-Feth

We must speak of Riadh el Feth. O that vision of the inaccessible West! Chadli decided to make this mirage a reality, in the heart of Algiers. A Canadian enterprise built a mall just like those springing up all over Montreal. The center became a fashionable meeting place for the young jet set.

Clad in jeans and leather jackets, young dandies and shopgirls would meet there to drink tea and groove to the rhythms of American videos shown on a myriad of television screens. Lovers could hold hands there and even kiss without having to endure cutting remarks.

Their parents were not worried, because they knew that a very strict private security service was protecting their children.

One of the most wretched quarters in Algiers stands right next door to that little morsel of North America. Built hastily of concrete breezeblocks during the war in the 1950's, these squalid, overcrowded units, with no balconies and ridiculously inadequate windows, border on that other universe.

But iron bars separate the two worlds (...).

Loudspeakers at the nearby mosques denounce the songs of Madonna and Michael Jackson. They inveigh against that temple of perdition, which they call "Houbel" in reference to a pre-Islamic deity, and condemn the worshippers of these new idols.

On 26 December 1991, that quarter of Algiers voted massively for the FIS.

#### Authorities To Redistribute Foreign Press After 2 Years

LD1806030492 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
2200 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] The Culture and Information Ministry reported today that the foreign press will be redistributed in Algeria following a two-year absence. The same source said that the government has taken measures to resume importation of publications, i.e., general interest papers

and specialized magazines. The resumption is possible thanks to the Bank of Algeria, which considered the financial difficulties facing the country before deciding on the price of each magazine in hard currency, a matter needed for such transactions.

### **Conference on Applications of Materials Science Held**

*92AF0891C Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French  
23 May 92 p 16*

[Article by N. Hammouche: "Materials Science"]

[Text] To the general public, materials are anything having to do with construction—brick, stone breeze-block or cement. They are useful to man in any kind of building for personal or public purposes.

There is a large branch of science devoted to the study and analysis of materials for their more effective utilization by man.

Organized by the state secretary for scientific research, a conference on materials science was held on Sunday 17 May 1992 at the headquarters of the Development Center for Nuclear Technologies [CDTN].

Academics, researchers and representatives from industry met to discuss—for the first time in Algeria—the important subject of materials science. As indicated in the introduction by Mr. Brahim, staff director of CERS, the themes selected for this conference mirrored the domains of industries and laboratories that make use of prepared materials: Ceramics, which are being developed by laboratories for modern uses such as construction materials and dishes. Metallurgy and machinery for industry (Sider is an example), semiconductors (the basis of all electronics), polymers and composite materials used for various purposes such as manufacture of electronic sheathing, radiological film and prostheses. The final theme was the advanced technology used to produce these materials.

These were the subjects discussed in the committees that were assigned various topics for the conference, which brought together interested parties from industry and research laboratories, whose direct contact enabled them to get an overview of their human and material potential. The interchange also made possible the definition of common research subjects, development strategies and training approaches. Various issues were also discussed, including controls, improvement of manufacturing processes, research in advanced technology, creation of linkages, and the needs of research laboratories.

In their final report, the five committees all agreed on two things: first, the lack of communication between industry and research laboratories, which necessitates the creation of an official structure to coordinate, handle and try to define common needs. Second, the obvious lack of documentation and information, which is considered an impediment to any effective and rapid work.

The speaker for the committee on ceramics and refractory materials noted that Algeria imports about \$40 million in refractory products, even though Algeria itself has ample raw materials, the exploitation of which would require a new industry that would generate jobs.

Mr. Tobbeche Said, director of CDTN, saw the conference as an opportunity for people in industry and research to get to know each other and establish joint projects to open up lines of endeavor involving materials science.

Out of the more than 40 enterprises invited to the conference, only 15 were represented. In the aftermath of the conference, CDTN plans to prepare a directory listing all the research centers, universities, industries and laboratories involved with materials science, to facilitate better contact between specialists in these different institutions, and thus benefit both science and the economy.

### **Books Reviewed on Emergence of Islam**

#### **'Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir'**

*92AF0895A Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French  
21-27 May 92 p 31*

[Review by Atika Garmat of *Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir (Islamic Fundamentalists in the Face of the Government)* by Aissa Khelladi, ALFA Publishing House, Algiers, 1992, 200 pp, 110 dinars]

[Text] Consisting for the most part of newspaper articles and commentaries that have appeared in the national press, *Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir (Islamic Fundamentalists in the Face of the Government)* by Aissa Khelladi has just joined the small number of books on Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria.

In his preface, Khelladi notes that Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria has been the subject of only a few books that are unavailable in our bookstores. His ambition was, therefore, to fill a void. Although they are rare, the two existing available books are the one by our colleague H'mida Layachi, who, with no pretensions whatever, has tackled this burning issue in a work entitled *Les Islamistes Algériens Entre le Pouvoir et les Balles (Algerian Islamic Fundamentalists Between the Government and Bullets)*, and that by Rabah Rouadjia entitled *Les Frères et la Mosquée (The Brethren and the Mosque)*, which deals with the importance of the mosque in the resurgence of the Algerian Islamic movement, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Khelladi also points out that he relied on a few unpublished documents including, among others, a report prepared for a foreign embassy in June 1990 and entitled "Algerian Fundamentalism," but he does not specify the embassy in question, and we do not know what that report contained since there is no footnote. This can only arouse doubt and suspicion in us. Moreover, the article by Francois Burgat entitled "From Islamic Secularism to

"Islamic Fundamentalism," which he also relies on, is a chapter taken from his book *L'Islam au Maghreb (Islam in the Maghreb)* (Karthala, 1988), in which he throws light on the phenomenon of re-Islamization and the use of Islamic vocabulary as the expression of a cultural repositioning in terms of Westernization.

In the course of a historical digression into the reasons for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, Khelladi seems convinced that if the state had not ruthlessly combated all opposition that might have been beneficial to it and if the state had realized that its attempt to modernize the country was a failure, Islamic fundamentalism would never have seen the light of day. Although that thesis is justified, it strikes me as being the least important aspect. The fact is that the reasons for the resurgence in question are many and complex. When it began, the fundamentalist fight was centered on the formal—and indeed the external—aspects of Islam (ritual obligations, clothing standards, and so on) and on the identifying aspect of Islam's claims as it also presented itself as the cultural extension of the ruptures born of decolonization. That authoritarian way of thinking is the pure and direct product of the despotism of Algerian regimes: "nothing clears the way for government by turbans better than government by boots," to quote Egyptian philosopher Fouad Zakariya.

It is not necessary to point out that all the conflicts between the state and the fundamentalists were political conflicts, even though both sides "Islamized" them. The state did so by claiming that it was combating religious extremism because of the latter's false interpretation of the teachings of Islam, and the fundamentalists did so by criticizing the "secular" and "pragmatic" aspects of the state's ideology and even calling it godless and pagan. Although Islam actually constituted a political challenge to the state, the latter gave it moral and material support that was decisive, especially during the 1980's. The purpose was to neutralize democratic and progressive tendencies. At the height of the confrontation with fundamentalists, the state-owned media were devoting an ever-increasing amount of space to religious programs, and religion enjoyed the greatest respect in the field of general education.

At no time did the state renounce its Islamic roots. There is no historical foundation for the myth of a Boumedienne era of secularism in which Islam was renounced.

Khelladi seems to doubt it. He wonders: how can Islam and socialism be reconciled? According to him, Boumediene solved the problem by adopting a voluntarist policy favoring industrialization and, therefore, modernization and reappropriation of the main referents of Western modernity. That amounts to the belief that modernization involves a break with one's values and one's religion.

Khelladi seems to forget that in their fight, the fundamentalists rely on the traditional religiosity of the masses. This enables them to hide behind a protective

halo of sanctity and to present their detractor as the one who is defying or violating that religious tradition.

One of the reasons for the alleged "rebirth of Islam"—which Aissa Khelladi does not mention—is the special interest that the West is taking in this "revival." That interest is easily explained as being an attempt to push the developments under way in our society in a direction consistent with the West's ambitions. There is also the failure by the world's two great ideologies in Muslim territory to convince the most radical individuals of the need to seek alternatives. Hence the conviction that either the revolution will be Islamic or there will not be one.

From reading Khelladi, one gets the impression that all the evils afflicting our society are the sinister work of a "socialist" troika, to mention only that one. For example, we read in more than one place that the "leftists" are the sworn enemies of Islam.

Impressed by the power of the Islamic movement, Khelladi sometimes seems convinced that the government was engaged in rearguard combat, presenting it at times as the victim of an ideological option that turned out to be a complete failure and as being responsible for the fratricidal struggles since 1982. He even goes so far as to say that he would like to have found a man like Ali Benhadj among the democrats—in other words, a democrat whose only merit was his oratorical talent and his activism. In his essay, Khelladi goes so far as to adopt as his own the orientalist view of an irremediably archaic Islam or the theological view of an imported socialism incompatible with the specific values of our culture. Ambiguous as his position is, Khelladi suggests a "better" way to us. In a long apologia, he emphasizes that it is urgent and necessary to recover Benabi's thought and expand his teaching.

According to him, Benabi was ignored by the government because he belongs to that class of "thinkers" who disturb people. Khelladi says that if antideocratic Algeria had not persecuted him, Algerian Islam would not have turned away from him to a caricature of Islamic ideology as introduced by visionaries from the East. Khelladi pretends to forget that the mosque at the Central School, where Benabi was the main instigator, was the antechamber to Algerian Islamic fundamentalism: the place where Arab speakers and French speakers fought over the famous "majless echchoura." In short, the spread of Benabi's thought could not fail to serve the fundamentalist cause in that it promoted the spread of that base of practicing literalist Muslims, which provides the ideal compost for Islamic fundamentalists. Claiming that the Algerian Islamic movement would not have experienced that fundamentalist dimension if the theses of the spiritual father of the PRA [Algerian Renewal Party] had been taken into account is the same as claiming, in other words, that "if we had changed bowls, it would not have been the same soup."

*Les Islamistes Face au Pouvoir*, which consists of three major sections, is far from constituting a thorough and objective analysis. The author himself admits that he is providing the reader with no more than an overview of this complex phenomenon. But in his overview with its abundance of "information," confusion and ambiguity rule supreme.

### 'Les Freres et la Mosquee'

92AF0895B Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French  
21-27 May 92 pp 32, 31

[Comments by Ahmed Rouadjia, researcher at Amiens University in France, concerning his own book *Les Freres et la Mosquee (The Brethren and the Mosque)*, published originally by Harmattan in France and republished by Bouchene in 1991, as told to Brahim Hadj Slimane; place and date not given: "Islamic Fundamentalism: Violence and Despair"; first three paragraphs are ALGERIE ACTUALITE introduction]

[Text] Ahmed Rouadjia looks much younger than his 45 years. Early this May, a period as loaded with rain-showers as it was with tension and the most apocalyptic rumors, he was spending his free time in an Algiers charged with electricity. Rouadjia is a researcher at Amiens University in France. Holding a doctorate in history, he taught at Batna University and then at Constantine University from 1983 until 1987, when he moved to France.

He is known above all for his book *Les Freres et la Mosquee (The Brethren and the Mosque)*, which was first published by Harmattan in France and then republished by Bouchene in 1991. His book brought its author notable success, beginning in France, and since then he has been interviewed by the media on issues concerned with Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria.

Although it does not take us into the deep waters of reflection and is even incomplete from the standpoint of the information it provides, the book has the advantage of being the first to come from an Algerian researcher and thus of breaking the monopoly held on the subject by Gilles Keppel, Bruno Etienne and company. Moreover, it is documented, practical, and written in simple language and unvarnished style.

This book shows how the religious and social terrain had been prepared over a long period by the Islamic movement, which has always been an underground movement. It is a book concerned both with the genesis or origin of Algerian Islamic fundamentalism and with the causes behind it.

Although the movement was present before it appeared in the open, the October explosion showed that it was rooted in society. Its establishment is therefore not at all something recent.

This book is still topical because it is concerned not with immediate history but with a span of time. What I do is

retrace the history of this movement in Algeria between 1962 and 1984. I therefore chose a starting chronology, and on that basis, I did the work of a historian, sociologist, and investigator. I combined the three methods in order to understand the current situation. It was necessary to go back to the successes experienced by the mosques: to explain the reasons for those tremendous successes in independent Algeria, the circumstances that gave the mosques such an attractive character, and the reasons why they constituted a focal point for young people.

### Multipurpose Mosques

Places of worship have not always been perceived of as places simply for prayer but also as places for recreation in the broad rather than the primary sense of the word. Since people are experiencing a multifaceted crisis—a crisis in society, a crisis in leisure-time activities (there are none in the city), and overcrowded apartments—they spend most of their time in the street, and some of them will be drawn to the mosques. The "Dou'ate" have thus found favorable ground for spreading their religious and especially political message.

This is more or less what they tell young people: "Instead of your being dragged down in the school of juvenile delinquency and following the path of deviation, Islam gives you the possibility of abandoning the wrong path. The real way of salvation is the mosque."

When all is said and done, it is a way of painting a glowing picture of moral and intellectual advantages and a means, perhaps a sound one when it started, of helping young delinquents in trouble by giving them a place where they can go and find space for sociability and communication in the shadow of a place of worship. But those original intentions have been diverted from their initial course and taken over for political ends.

### Boumediene, His RA, His 'Volunteers'

I take as the starting point for my chronology the RA [Agrarian Revolution] that was decreed in early 1970 and 1971. The regime was committed to three fronts in its famous triple revolution: agrarian, industrial, and cultural.

It was a period that also coincided with the nationalization of French petroleum interests. Boumediene needed outside support for his administration. He found it in the RA brigades, which were more or less Marxist-leaning groups headed by the PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party] but also by Socialist young people who supported his policy. In their eyes he was a nationalist and a revolutionary: a man who was there to satisfy the expectations of the Algerian people.

Paradoxically, it was also at that time, in February 1970, that the UNEA [National Union of Algerian Students] was dissolved. It was radical and farther left than the government. Hard to please and with a message that was

leftist in connotation, it was a danger to the regime and a hindrance to the latter's policy.

But one year later, Boumediene was able to co-opt what he himself had repressed and to enroll the students in what he called the RA brigades.

That was the incredible thing. First he dissolved a movement, but then, a year later, he took it over and used it to carry out his support campaigns.

What was the RA? It did not involve the complete expropriation of landed property but rather the limitation of such property. But it was perceived by Islamic fundamentalists—who were still in their infancy—as an anti-Islamic measure. Because, they said, Islam does not prohibit private property. They had interpreted those measures as constituting expropriation. The mobilization in support of Boumediene was therefore viewed by the fundamentalists as constituting aggression both political and cultural, all the more since the brigades of volunteers were reputed, rightly or wrongly, to be communist.

Then there was the famous speech in Lahore in 1974. That was a very important date for Islamic fundamentalists, because it proved the "atheistic" and infidel character of Boumediene. It furthered the spread and entrenchment of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism obviously goes back further than that—to the early days of independence. It dates back to the El Quiyam Association, which was dissolved in 1965 and again in 1970—and was therefore hunted down twice. Even with members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hachemi Tadjani) in its midst, it was purely national and did not really have the support of young people. Those who supported its actions had links with the "ulama": Abassi Madani, Nahnah, and so on. But it left its traces in the form of people who have picked up the torch.

#### Constantine: Islamic Breeding Ground

I can say that Constantine was one of the reservoirs for the Islamic movement—a breeding ground. If you, as a journalist, investigate the Islamic fundamentalist leaders, you will find that three-fourths of them either spent time in Constantine or were in contact with it through the "ulama." It has always been regarded by them as the center of Islam.

Then came a shift from Constantine to Algiers. I would even say from Tlemcen, which has always been linked to Constantine through sponsors and preachers and with permanent exchanges and trips back and forth by emissaries and so on based in Tlemcen.

Algiers then took over completely and attracted the important preachers. The protests and toughest revolts took place in Algiers. That is natural, since political leadership cannot be anywhere except in the capital. Protest movements cannot put pressure on the regime except by electing to establish themselves in the capital—in the place where orders must be given and things

must be centralized. The Algerian fundamentalist system is centrally organized. Establishment of the "rabita" of the "Da'wa" was not a matter of chance at that level, even though Sheikh Sahnoun has been relatively overshadowed by the young lions.

To get back to the leaders, let us take Benhadj as an example. He first lived in the east—in Constantine—before making a name for himself in Algiers. Abassi, a former member of the ulama, also lived in the city for a time, notably in the shadow of a certain Sheikh Naim Naimi, mufti of the Algerian ulama and the man in charge of religious affairs in Constantine from 1962 until his death. There are other similar cases of anonymous Islamic fundamentalist militants.

#### FIS Flood

The electoral successes achieved by the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] are due not to the party's effectiveness, since it is not an ideologically and politically coherent—that is, convincing—party, but to the feeling people have that they have been swindled by the regime and subjected to the government's injustice. Politically, the FIS is not a party that could succeed in its effort to "Islamize" society and social and economic management. Its support among the people is due mainly to the latter's poverty, their daily problems, and their loss of confidence in the state. There have been too many injustices and social inequalities.

The people therefore elected a party that talked in simple terms about justice in the name of Islam. A party that makes promises and carries them out, to some extent, through its charitable works. It "bought" the hearts of the masses, something the government was unable to do. What I mean is that it played more on people's feelings and was stronger in the areas of affectivity and specific charitable action than in the area of politics in the modern sense.

Under the current circumstances, any party speaking the same language would win. Even if it appealed only to social justice and left out the religious concept. Any party, even a secular one (if it did not stress the point), would win if it engaged in charitable activities at the grassroots level and denounced injustice.

The Algerian people are Muslim without the FIS. But that movement has added social demands by setting justice and Islam side by side and assimilating the one with the other.

#### Violence and Despair

In my opinion, the violence of Islamic fundamentalists reflects the violence in society itself. What made the population violent and aggressive? Its unbearable social conditions: housing and the overcrowding in apartments. There are people who cannot undress under decent conditions in their own homes. And people who cannot get married and lead a regular life because of that.

Violence is not consubstantial with the Algerian people. It is new, and it is linked to the phenomenon of modernity: the transition from a traditional society to anarchic and poorly controlled modernization. Individuals arriving from the rural areas were experiencing the city for the first time. Individuals accustomed to having a roof open to the sky and living in gigantic and roomy space were suddenly finding themselves locked in like lions in a cage. They became aggressive.

Then the mosques came along to channel those energies toward a given objective. The Islamic fundamentalist leaders realized that and used it to put together a strike force with which to move toward taking power.

### Milk Shortages Reported; Causes Debated

*92AF0891B Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French  
25 May 92 p 3*

[Article by Akila Benahmed, including his interview with Mr. Djabellah, general manager of ORLAC (Birkhadem dairy), place and date not given: "Milk Shortage: Whose Fault?"]

[Text] The termination of state support for essential staples—and soon for milk—does not by itself explain the "stampede" of Algerians to buy up milk. With the weather very hot, citizens prefer to freeze the milk, to avoid the increased risk it will go bad. This explains—though it does not excuse—the fact that the dairy stalls are stripped clean so early in the day. Add to that the use of milk for making those ice creams that are so popular, and the stampede is understandable. Does ORLAC [Birkhadem dairy]—which is supposed to meet demand, even when excessive—understand this?

We went to the general headquarters at Hussein-Dey for more information from Mr. Boumediene, director of distribution for ORLAC, who explained:

"Our clients, the merchants, are supplied by distributors. However, in downtown Algiers and certain densely populated quarters, distribution is restricted, especially for heavy trucks. The wilaya allows the trucks to begin serving at 0400 hours in the morning (at 0100 hours in periods of tension). So, what do we see? Late risers will find nothing, and it's not our fault. Distribution is handled correctly, and supply is greater than demand."

Mr. Boumediene, who is in charge of distribution to the 13 wilayas in the center, calls this problem of excess consumption a "hysteria."

According to him, "production is good and so is distribution, so what is all this din from the public and the media?"

It may be true there is excess consumption, but citizens are within their rights to purchase all the milk or anything else they can to protect themselves from the daily erosion of their purchasing power. It's up to the state-owned enterprises—since they are responsible for

the shortages—to keep tabs on sales to ensure that supply stays ahead of demand in a virtually free market where competition will determine success or failure in the future, whether these enterprises like it or not. We are confident that Algerians who have been "burned" by the all too numerous and frequent shortages will know which products can be stored and which are perishable.

But our enterprises have always underproduced, it seems, rationing citizen consumption in various domains. An enterprise that sells things should always be trying to sell more. But ours simply don't understand that. One thing is sure: The monopoly is doing it again!

### Interview

[Benahmed] Lines stretch out in front of every dairy truck in search of milk. We have interviewed the consumers. Some say it's due to a shortage, others to poor distribution. What's the truth?

[Djabellah] Everyone's talking about milk, especially the journalists: Is there a shortage or poor distribution? It is true there are periods of reduced production, due to the heat, for example. But that is not the case here, because ORLAC has a high production capacity, and we are able to meet demand. We have five [production] units working 24 hours a day: Boudouaou, Birkhadem, Bentamour (Blida), Ain Defla, and Draa Ben Khedda. Let's take Birkhadem as an example: It produces 600,000 liters a day, and the five plants together produce 1,900,000 liters a day.

[Benahmed] So where is the problem?

[Djabellah] There is no distribution problem, because distribution is on a sectoral basis; the problem, I think, is one of demand being greater than supply, and I will give you an example: A couple buys 10 packets of milk instead of two, in order to freeze some of them. So imagine 10 couples each buying 10 packets. There would be none left for the others.

[Benahmed] If couples or citizens in general are buying dozens of milks, it is precisely for fear of not being able to find any tomorrow.

[Djabellah] But if they buy in small quantities, don't you see, they will find milk tomorrow.

[Benahmed] So it really is a problem of supply and demand.

[Djabellah] We produce 1.9 million liters per day, as I said, and that is plenty. If milk is in short supply in a few specific locations, that is due to the design of those quarters, which cannot accommodate the heavy trucks we use.

[Benahmed] A ship recently arrived in the port of Algiers carrying 1,400 tons of dried milk. Reportedly, it was rejected. Why?

[Djabellah] That is true. We received 1,400 tons of dried milk, and it was a very high-quality product, this can be verified. We refused it because it was "Lactoseron" powder rather than the product we had ordered. We have refused to allow the ship to depart pending an investigation.

## IRAQ

### AL-IRAQ Criticizes Kurdish Elections

92AE0405A *Baghdad AL-IRAQ in Arabic* 16 May 92  
pp. 1, 6

[“AL-IRAQ Comment” column]

[Text]

#### The Great Betrayal in the ‘Elections’ Trick

Now what? Where will the aggression and conspiracy end? Within the scope of their conspiracy and aggression they are now talking about “elections” in Kurdistan, Iraq, a precious part of the homeland’s territory, which has become isolated. The Kurds have become a people deserving of the foreigner’s compassion, sympathy, benevolence, and protection!

Is this the way in which decisions are made to interfere in independent countries’ internal affairs in accordance to the concepts of the new, American international order?

Is this the way in which the sovereignty of a country—which is a member of the United Nations, and whose legislative organizations and National Assembly enjoy membership in the International Parliamentary Federation and the Arab Parliamentary Federation—is violated? We maintain that this is a new chapter in the great conspiracy woven by U.S., Western, and Zionist intelligence circles to harm the unity of Iraq’s territory, people, and common destiny. The colonialist, imperialist attack to which Iraq has been subjected should awaken the world to still concealed facts. It should reveal to the world the extent of U.S. arrogance, impudence, and haughtiness in blackmailing independent countries and exerting especially repugnant pressure on them to relinquish their independent national decision[making prerogative] and their adherence to their firm position of rejecting a foreign mandate.

The 30-state aggression against Iraq embodied an adventurous U.S. military program based on the terms of late 20th century neocolonialism under the heading of “the new international order.”

Now that the repugnant war, the subsequent treacherous invasion and sabotage by Iran, and the unjust economic blockade have failed to achieve their spiteful goals of killing morale and extinguishing the firebrand of life burning in the depths of 18 million Iraqis, our enemies are now resorting to the old/new scheme of dividing

national unity and provoking sectarian and racial chauvinism among the people of the one fatherland. Is not the “Kurdish card” the best card for inciting such chauvinism? They play this menacing card through a handful of agents and mercenaries supported by the sidearms of the [Kurdish clan] chiefs, who are known for their close relations with Zionist circles and reactionary regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.

In this dirty way, which will only end in total loss, they have been campaigning and holding carnivals for several weeks now, and mobilizing their media skills and agencies of falsehood, deception, and forgery to talk about “free elections” in Kurdistan, Iraq!

Free!? Can freedom and its advantages be enjoyed in a climate of foreign occupation under the protection of American, British, and French bayonets? Is freedom granted and guaranteed on a silver platter by the people’s enemies, the suckers of the Kurds’ blood, and the usurpers of their right to a free, honorable life? Is it true that the Kurds of Iraq are denied freedom and [participation in] the legislative and executive assemblies which represent them and express their will? Are the Kurds of Iraq denied their national rights and their right to enjoy all of the privileges granted to them by the 11 March Statement and the Self-Rule Law?

Is not this hypocrisy in its ugliest form?

Is not this falsehood, distortion, and circumvention of clear facts?

Who is launching campaigns to eradicate the Kurds? Who is enacting unjust laws and issuing resolutions characterized by deep-rooted racism and reactionism, which prohibit millions of Kurds in Turkey and Iran from even speaking their national language and wearing their national dress? Are those Kurds [in Turkey and Iran] not more deserving of protection and crocodile tears? Are they not more deserving of elections to express their national identity? The answer is no according to the putrefied, ossified logic of colonialism, which is the logic of our enemies, who are not pleased by the sight of Iraq recovering, healing the wounds of treachery, and rising with great strength and majesty to continue its triumphant march under President Saddam Husayn’s leadership to promote development throughout the fatherland.

If the United States and its allies in the war and aggression against Iraq think that holding such disgracefully phony elections will fulfill their plots and dreams and bring them out of the dark, gloomy corridors and abodes of treachery into the light, they are wrong and only deceiving their sick selves and those petty agents who linked themselves in the end to the decisionmaking kitchens in Washington, Paris, and London.

Those evildoers who have been lurking in Iraq since the glorious 17-30 July 1968 Revolution are wrong if they believe at any time that they can falsify the documents of history, play with national geographic borders, and sow the seeds of dissension, fear, and doubt in the single Iraqi

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family. Iraq's territory and people have defied every invasion wave and savage legion throughout their ancient and modern history. By virtue of their steely resolve and firm belief in their common destiny, they have passed through their most difficult and complicated time, emerging from it stronger, more resolute, and more determined to survive within sacred, indivisible borders which cannot be tampered with. We are confident and unshakably certain, no matter how dim the picture seems, that the elections trick will not deceive honorable Kurds in the northern Iraq, and that the fate of elections will fare no better than that of all the other reactionary and colonialist attempts that have been made to dismember Iraq's territory, fragment its people into small groups, and cast shadows of doubt on the strength and the depth of its national unity.

As for the agents and enemies of the Arabs and the Kurds who have acquiesced in being mere wooden pawns in a dirty, staged, weak colonialist game bearing the spurious name of "elections"—as for them, their day of reckoning and hour of punishment are not far off. Ultimately, they will reap only calamity, shame, and eternal dishonor. What a shameful fate! It is the just recompense awaiting those who have fallen into the abyss of great treachery, who snub the soil of the fatherland, the honor of citizenship, and commitment to great Iraq.

## LIBYA

## GPC Affirms Official Position on Extradition Issue

92AF0930A Paris *LE MONDE* in French  
16 Jun 92 pp 1,4

[Article by Mouna Naim, special correspondent in Tripoli: "Colonel al-Qadhafi and the West: Libya Alternates Threats and Conciliation"—first paragraph is *LE MONDE* introduction]

[Text] The General People's Congress [GPC] (Libya's version of a parliament) has been in session since 13 June in Surt. It has condemned the request by the United States and Great Britain for the extradition of two Libyans in connection with the bomb attack over Lockerbie. Col. al-Qadhafi, whose hold on power still seems secure, can be expected to clarify his position in an address to the Congress. Meanwhile, the official press is suggesting a radical change in relations with the West.

Tripoli—Libya is determined indeed to have the world reeling as it blows hot and cold in the Lockerbie case, first signaling that it may turn over its two nationals suspected of having a hand in the bombing of the Pan Am flight; then rejecting the idea.

In what is a pretense of democracy, almost every newspaper mirrors the official point of view: On Sunday, 14 June, the weekly AL JAMAHIRIYA—the voice of the "revolutionary committees"—criticized Mr. 'Abdal-Razaq al-Susa, the secretary general of the General

People's Congress (Libya's version of a parliament), for suggesting the previous day that the law does not permit the extradition of the two Libyan suspects, Mr. 'Abdal-Basit al-Muqarabi and Mr. al-Amin Khalifah Fuhaymah, to the United States or Great Britain. AL JAMAHIRIYA wrote that Mr. al-Susa "represents no one but himself. His words do not convey the unanimous position of the Libyan people as the People's Congress has yet to draft all of its resolutions."

The deliberations at this annual session of the legislative body in Surt are expected to last several days.

Of the five committees that were formed following the opening assembly on Saturday, one is responsible for foreign policy. It is the only committee whose deliberations are not broadcast live on television. It is true, as AL JAMAHIRIYA stated, that Mr. al-Susa is "a mere civil servant who chairs a committee charged with drafting resolutions." But in this complex and unique system of "direct" democracy, it is just as true that the Congress is merely a rubber-stamp chamber that approves the decisions made by the popular committees, which completed their work several days ago.

Libya's top officials, for their part, have held to the same line of defense since the case opened: "no" to the extradition of the two suspects to the United States; "yes" to handing them over to neutral parties. Col. al-Qadhafi's concern seems to be one of obtaining assurance that the questioning of the two suspects will be strictly limited to the Lockerbie bombing and not lead to other issues that could ultimately place the entire machinery of the state on trial.

## An Embargo on Pilgrimages

Then, who is to be believed? AL JAMAHIRIYA, which one week ago dared to criticize Col. al-Qadhafi's pan-Arab policy and advocate a move in the direction of the United States? Or, Mr. al-Susa, who in his address to the Congress accused "the United States, Great Britain, and France of waging a crusade against the Arabs and Muslims in order to achieve total domination over the Near East?"

According to Western diplomats stationed in Tripoli, the AL JAMAHIRIYA article is neither a fluke nor a reflection of the opinion of the ordinary citizen. As they see it, the swift rebuke to the speaker of the Congress indicates that Libya intends to announce something that it believes could satisfy the United States and Great Britain. If their theory is correct, Col. al-Qadhafi can be expected to address the Congress very soon and attempt to change the course of things.

"The Jamahiriya is not responsible (for this attack)," Mr. al-Susa affirmed. "The Jamahiriya extends its deep regrets to the innocent victims. It remains ready to cooperate (with all those who wish it) to find a just solution rooted in international law (...) and to support any effort that would bring about such a settlement." That speech dampened the hopes of the many who

interpreted AL JAMAHIRIYA's recent comments as a sign of change in Tripoli's attitude. The country has been under an air and military embargo since 15 April.

Mr. al-Susa's militant mood was shared by delegates to the Congress: "The accusations against the Jamahiriya are entirely fabricated. They (the two Libyans) must not be extradited," we were told by Mrs. 'Atiqah 'Abdal-Bani al-Dib and Mr. Kihadmilah al-Khair. "The Libyan people have always managed to stand up to foreign aggression," added the lawyer Rahma al-Amin. Libya's ambassador to France, Mr. Sa'd al-Mujbir, also a member of the Congress, spoke in even more heated terms: "Anyone who wishes to express his opinion in AL JAMAHIRIYA is free to do so. It is not the official point of view. We have always managed to resist and we will continue to resist."

According to residents of Tripoli and Western sources, the international community's partial quarantining of Libya has not taken a serious toll on the local population thus far. The country's land borders are seeing a brisk traffic as are the ports. The shortage of pharmaceuticals is nothing new. The greatest hardship for many Libyans has been the impossibility of making the pilgrimage to Mecca this year given the difficulties and cost of traveling by road to an Arab country from which they could continue the journey by plane.

#### "A Beacon of Light"

Matters would be much worse if the embargo were extended to oil exports, which provide 90 percent of Libya's revenues. To Col. al-Qadhdhafi, at least, the embargo is "a sign of the complete breakdown of the international political system." "If we continue at the present pace, the entire world will become one big prison. Embargoes are currently in effect against Libya, Iraq, and Serbia. Tomorrow—who knows? Syria, and Lebanon, Sudan and—why not?—(North) Korea and China...." he exclaimed to the International Conference of Environmentalists, which was also held in Surt and saw itself as an "alternative" to the Earth Summit in Rio.

Coincidence or premeditation? One is inclined to think the latter. Two "international" conferences took place in Libya last week—the one on the environment and the other on human rights—and the local media presented them as proof of the support Col. al-Qadhdhafi enjoys around the world.... His position in Libya hardly seems threatened, at any rate. Several times during the weekend, Libyan television broadcast images of a relaxed and smiling colonel embracing residents of Surt, inaugurating an exhibition of representational art, and speaking from the podium at the International Conference of Environmentalists.

Mr. al-Susa sang the colonel's praises in his speech, declaring to the applause of the "legislators" that "Arab unity remains Libya's objective and will be achieved without the shadow of a doubt under the leadership of the Guide." Posted in the Great Hall of Faithfulness where the Congress is meeting, slogans written in white

characters on a green background paid even greater tribute to Col. al-Qadhdhafi: "1 September 1969 (the day on which Col. al-Qadhdhafi came to power) is the very blood in our veins, the pulse of our hearts, the beacon of light that dispels humanity's dark shadows."

The ordinary Libyan citizen, to the extent that his silence can be interpreted, seems rather indifferent to these goings-on. On Sunday in Tripoli, a city awakening from the torpor of the three-day holiday of 'Id al-Adha commemorating Abraham's sacrifice, walls were plastered with posters ridiculing the United States on the 22d anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. troops: One poster showed a fleeing G.I., a skull and crossbones on his helmet, his belongings bundled up in the Stars and Stripes; another depicted a small boat adrift with boots, canteens, and an American flag tossed into it.

Along the waterfront, a few strollers stopped to have their picture taken, without a smile, against a backdrop that might have appealed to Andy Warhol—a montage of objects including a Vespa from the 1960's and a stuffed tiger, with an artificial red rose bush in the background. Still, several days ago a Western diplomat heard a Libyan call out to him in the street for all to hear, "What are you waiting for to free us from this regime?"

## MOROCCO

#### Government Reiterates Rejection of EC Financial Protocol

LD1206133992 Rabat MAP in Arabic 0925 GMT  
11 Jun 92

[Text] Rabat, 11 Jun (MAP)—In reply to a question from MAP on the negotiations held some time ago within the specialized committees and groups of the European Parliament over the possibility of discussing the fourth financial protocol between Morocco and the EC in a public session, the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation spokesman confirmed the Moroccan Government's stand which was made clear in January 1992. This stand is that Morocco refuses to act in accordance with this protocol, no matter what interpretations are put on it in Strasbourg.

The spokesman added that Morocco and the EC are currently working together to define a model for the relationship between them. This goes beyond the former narrow frame of cooperation, with the aim of developing a special partnership which matches Morocco's and the EC's legitimate and great ambitions. He stressed that this partnership will be based on mutual trust and respect.

#### Accord With Poland Reportedly Broadens Trade Prospects

92AF0896C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 29 May 92 p 33

[Article: "Increasing Moroccan-Polish Trade"]

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[Text] The multifaceted cooperation agreement recently signed between the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the National Chamber of Commerce of Poland is intended to consolidate cooperation between the two countries by boosting trade.

Most important, the two sides agreed to increase and diversify direct contacts between entrepreneurs in the two countries.

Previously limited to phosphates and sulfur, trade between Morocco and Poland is bound to soar thanks to this accord and the ensuing partnerships.

The contacts to be established open prospects for cooperation in new sectors such as agrofood, plums and early vegetables, textiles, clothing and leather, as well as the maritime sector.

Polish exports to Morocco have been steadily increasing. Its exports include structural steel, nonferrous metals, light bulbs, telephones, tools, piping, textile machinery and railroad equipment parts.

We note finally that in response to the visit of the Polish delegation headed by Mr. Tadeusz Zylkowski, vice president of the National Economic Chamber of Poland, a delegation of Moroccan businessmen is expected in Poland this autumn.

#### **King Hassan Grants Free Pardons on Occasion of 'Id al-Adha**

*LD1106194292 Rabat MAP in English 1311 GMT  
11 Jun 92*

[Text] Rabat, Jun 11 (MAP)—King Hassan II granted free pardon to several detainees on the occasion of the Muslim 'Id al-Adha.“

Eighty-five people were pardoned remaining years in jail and forty others have their sentences reduced. Twenty-seven benefit from total or partial pardon for jail sentences and have to pay fines and three people were exempted from paying fines.

#### **Former Prisoners in Iran Thank King for Help on Release**

*LD1506032392 Rabat Moroccan Kingdom Radio Network in Arabic 2300 GMT 14 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] A group of Moroccan citizens who were prisoners in Iran during the Iraq-Iran war sent a cable to His Majesty King Hassan II—may God grant him victory—on the occasion of 'Id al-'Adha. They expressed their allegiance, loyalty, thanks, and gratitude to his majesty for intervening in the case of their release. They congratulated his majesty on the blessed 'Id al-'Adha, praying for his good health, well-being, and constant victory and for the protection of all in the noble royal family. [passage omitted]

#### **MPCD Leader: Party To Participate in Elections**

*92AF0812A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
13 May 92 p 4*

[Unsigned article: "Moroccan Party Leader Decides To Return to Politics"]

[Text] Rabat—Dr. Abd-al-Karim Khatib, chairman of the Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel party [MPCD], confirmed that his party intends to take part in the elections that are to be organized this coming summer in Morocco. Khatib, who chaired a meeting of MPCD leaders in Casablanca, welcomed the appeal by the Moroccan monarch, King Hassan II, to young Moroccans to get involved in politics, highlighting the need to adhere to Islamic principles.

Dr. Khatib is a first generation nationalist who struggled for independence and headed the first Moroccan parliament in 1963. Along with al-Mahjubi Ahradan, he founded the MPCD in the late fifties as their protest against the Istiqlal party's monopoly of Moroccan political life of that time. The Ahradan-Khatib coalition, however, could not resist subsequent political events of the sixties, so on his own he founded the party he still leads, which lacks representation in the present parliament.

#### **OADP Leader on Current Political Topics**

*92AF0847A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic  
8 May 92 pp 30-31*

[Interview with Mohamed Bensaid, secretary general of the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action, by Kismet Turan: "Mohamed Bensaid, Leader of OADP in Morocco: 'The Socialist Theory Did Not Fail; Its Experiments Did,'" in Rabat, date not given]

[Text] Mohamed Bensaid, leader of the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action [OADP], is one of those figures who is known to everyone in Morocco. Being one of the founders of the resistance movement for independence, he is considered one of the leaders of the liberation army which fought the Spaniards in the Sahara. Bensaid is described by some as a credible person who is at peace with himself and can see things clearly. Others, however, who find his party to be an ultra left-wing party, describe him as a rejectionist, a member of the opposition, and an extremist.

Mohamed Bensaid sought political asylum in Algeria after being sentenced to death in the wake of the so-called July conspiracy, that is, the 1965 students' uprising. He lived in France, and he was pardoned by King Hasan the Second in 1980. When he returned to Morocco, he and his colleagues established the OADP, a party which has representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. Bensaid, who had described the Istiqlal Party as a reactionary party and who used to be a member of the National Alliance, got his party to rejoin the Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Union in a coalition of principle,

despite the fact that the latter had split with the National Alliance. That was the premise for our first question to Bensaid.

**We Are Calling for a National Committee To Oversee the Elections**

[Turan] Have existing conditions and circumstances changed to make this coalition warranted? Is this a circumstantial coalition or a strategic one? Has it been forged to confront the coalition of other semi-governmental parties in preparation for the legislative elections which are to be held in the coming months? Is winning a majority in the Chamber of Deputies the purpose of joining this coalition, and would having such a majority be the first step to forming a government and being in a position to control decisions?

[Bensaid] In the past, that is in the thirties, forties, and fifties, members of the Istiqlal Party came from all walks of life. They included workers, farmers, intellectuals, professionals, and members of the petty bourgeoisie; and all these people worked for independence. Well-informed and knowledgeable factions which emerged within that party were represented by Mehdi Ben Barka, Mahjub Ben Sadik, Abdallah Ibrahim, and others. They had their own view of the struggle that was going on at the time, a time that preceded the establishment and the organization of political parties. Briefly stated, they questioned how that party, whose ranks included groups and individuals with disparate education and views, could share the decision-making process with the government.

There was no other party on the scene beside the Istiqlal Party. Party members could either assume the responsibility, that is, the responsibility of government, and implement an unambiguous program which had been outlined by their party, or they could stay out of government. Party members disagreed, of course, about the status and makeup of constitutional institutions, and they disagreed about taking part in the Advisory Council which was to draft the constitution. The ranks of the party eventually broke up, and the National Alliance of Popular Forces led by Mehdi Ben Barka was created. Other parties subsequently experienced the pain of such divisions or breakups. The point I want to make here is that this party is an extension of the national movement we had in the past. I would point out that today the Istiqlal Party is an opposition party: its issues are our issues, and its demands are our demands.

[Turan] How would you summarize for us these common issues and demands?

[Bensaid] First of all, we would call for democracy, and we would want that democracy to be established on firm grounds. We would then call for political, statutory, and regulatory guarantees to ensure the integrity of the elections. We would call for an end to the control that is exercised by the Ministry of Interior. Second, we would demand that the state continue its oversight of public

facilities and the transfer of publicly owned establishments to private ownership. The state should continue to oversee the reduction of social differences and the efforts that are being made to draft a plan for development, for the economy, for agrarian reform, and for other matters as well. All these demands are the product of a historic struggle which was carried out by the people of Morocco. It is to be pointed out that the parties to the present coalition or those who are about to join it were represented in the past by one cohesive family whose members stood together and stayed together. This is not to say, of course, that ideological differences over the course of the economy do not exist among these parties. And yet the parties to the coalition have an important and a fundamental agreement between them about outlining a program which would represent the minimum courses of action which they have in common so that all of them could be put into effect.

[Turan] Is this the same view which you share with the Socialist Union Party, which, among the political parties on the scene, is considered the Istiqlal Party's true rival?

[Bensaid] I was one of the founders and defenders of the National Alliance of Popular Forces which was established in 1959. Like other Arab progressive movements, this party experienced crises after the sixties. The foundations of Arab nationalism were undermined after 1967, the year of the disaster, and the cracks which resulted from that disaster became more pronounced in the seventies. The late Abdelkarim Bouabed broke away from the National Alliance in 1972 and established the Socialist Union Party. In the seventies there was also a faction of Moroccan leftists called the Front. It included members of the 23 March Group whose work among young people and students was carried out clandestinely. Although I was a fighter among members of that tendency, I was outside the country after that date as a result of a dispute that occurred between me and one of these factions.

[Turan] How did these disputes manifest themselves?

[Bensaid] Actually, these disputes were a small reflection of the crises which national movements inside and outside Morocco were experiencing. The 1968 French students' rebellion and Mao Tse Tung's movement in China dominated the world. Young people, who were attempting to change social conditions as well as political and social systems, were influenced by that rebellion whose events dominated their thinking. But when I returned to Morocco in 1981, I joined a group of colleagues who represented this tendency, and we put together a political organization which was called the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action. The OADP pursued a new political course which is reflected in the dialogue policy it employed. It avoided bilateral meetings and ideological conflicts, and it replaced these conflicts with basic guidelines for organized strategic action to build a democratic, parliamentary system in Morocco. This would be done to get rid of all the

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negative attributes of the past and to bring about justice and equal opportunity in employment.

[Turan] What about the economic school of thought?

[Bensaid] The economic school of thought is being developed. At the Organization for Scientific, Socialist Action we proposed our own school of thought on economic matters and on agrarian reform in particular. According to our school of thought, the state would oversee all the strategic sectors of the economy. At the same time, it would encourage the private sector which, on the one hand, would serve the cause of development and, on the other hand, continue its effort to raise the social and economic standards of most toilers and workers.

#### The Socialist Theory

[Turan] What is happening now, however, indicates that radical socialist systems, like communism, for example, are collapsing....

[Bensaid] We believe that it was not the socialist theory itself which failed, but rather the experiments which these regimes carried out that did. The socialist experiment which was applied in the Soviet Union and in other socialist bloc countries failed because it did not employ democracy and it allowed bureaucracy to gain ground. These countries did not take advantage of the experience and progress which young people had acquired. Young people, therefore, did not contribute to the political life that was being built, and they did not contribute to the country's economic progress. They remained on the sidelines despite the progress which these countries had achieved in the scientific field.

[Turan] Interest in scientific progress or attention to it will not feed the hungry,...[Bensaid interrupted me].

[Bensaid] That is true. The economy here is making horizontal progress. The cooperatives, for example, are state-owned, and the state is the source of their capital. Unlike productive people such as engineers, workers, and craftsmen, these cooperatives do not take part in the process of construction and production. That is why we ought to be taking from these experiments that which is compatible with our Islamic traditions, our country, and our people. The bourgeoisie in our country is self-serving, and its only concern is to make a profit and serve its own interests. It is not like the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries whose goals include making a profit and building the economy.

[Turan] How do you see the privatization process for which preparations are now being made in Morocco? In other words, what do you think about selling state-owned establishments and institutions to the private sector?

[Bensaid] We agree with the state that institutions, like hotels and small firms, should be acquired by the private sector so that production can be improved. And yet, private owners must guarantee workers' rights and gains.

Therefore, we do not support private ownership of large or strategic institutions, such as the phosphate sector; the land, air, or sea transportation sector; or other institutions. We think that oversight of these institutions should be restricted to the state. We have heard offers coming out of the private sector to buy profitable, public establishments from the state. Others in government are calling upon the state to make improvements in these establishments before selling them to the private sector. To put it briefly, we are against that position. We think that profitable sectors must remain under the supervision of the state so the state can continue reaping those profits. The state can then utilize those profits at other production sites, or it can improve workers' conditions at those sites. The state must continue to be in that position because the self-serving bourgeoisie does not struggle for long-term goals. Members of the bourgeoisie work for profit and short-term goals.

[Turan] What critical remarks would you make against the present government along those lines? How do you see the future?

[Bensaid] We agreed at our last conference that the present government was made up of nothing but exalted civil servants who cannot solve the radical problems which are pending. A major social struggle lies ahead of us: a struggle in education, in affecting a cultural shift, and in housing conditions. The government was silent, and it had nothing to say, particularly in the area of education, in response to the strike that was held. Not only did it not respond to the people's demands, but it was not even able to conduct a dialogue with them. Although the demands set forth by residents of that sector were fair, the government's failure to respond to them demonstrated its impotence.

[Turan] Do you agree with the articles to amend the constitution which have been proposed and agreed to?

[Bensaid] We proposed the idea of amending the constitution at the recent conference of the OADP. We called for the separation of powers so that the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities would have their own areas of jurisdiction. We called for making the government accountable to parliament. The reforms which we in the OADP are calling for manifest themselves in bringing about a constitutional, parliamentary system. That is why we are calling for citizen involvement and for a charter that would lay a strong and firm foundation for democracy and reforms. The National Movement would draft the principles and articles of that charter just as they drafted the charter of independence. It is our view that the present government is not playing any role in this regard. It is also our view that where we are now is the result of past elections which were forged. That is why we are joining our allies in the four parties, and we are demanding that there be a national committee to oversee the integrity of the elections. (The Progress Party and Mr. Ali Maqih's Socialist Party, which is a communist party, may join these four parties.)

[Turan] Do you not think that this coalition is a temporary one?

[Bensaïd] No, not at all. It is not temporary because the program through which we will outline prospects for the future is being prepared and worked on now.

#### The Sahara Referendum: A Compelling Situation

[Turan] You took part in the war to liberate the Sahara. Then the Madrid Treaty was signed to get the Sahara back from the Spaniards. Then the Polisario was born. What do you think about the referendum which will be overseen by the United Nations? In your opinion, is it surmountable?

[Bensaïd] The referendum was forced upon Morocco under critical circumstances. While Algeria was playing a fundamental role on the international scene and in African relations, the kingdom was living in considerable isolation. As the king said previously, and I confirm what he said, he resorted to a referendum, "to find a conciliatory formula between Morocco and Algeria." We were critical of the weak diplomacy which Morocco had pursued in the past. Those who oppose our unity took advantage of our weak diplomacy: they established international relations, and they isolated Morocco, even from its friends. We do not believe that there is a Sahrawi nation calling for the independence of the Sahara because most Sahrawis defended the Sahara and fought in the war for its liberation. The Sahara is Moroccan, and we will not give it up. What we said was spoken clearly and unequivocally in a trilateral framework which included us and our allies from the Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Union Party. Every unambiguous position taken by our brothers in Algeria today will contribute to a solution to this question. Statutory matters will not hold back any political agreement between the two countries.

[Turan] It is being said that Mohamed Bensaïd is a rejectionist who rejects everything. What do you have to say about that charge?

[Bensaïd] I do not believe that I am a rejectionist. I am open to concepts, ideas, and opinions which would serve the interests of the country and the unity of the rank.

[Turan] The rejection we are talking about here signifies extremist opinions.

[Bensaïd] There is nothing wrong with having multiple opinions. Bensaïd has good relations with everyone, and he respects other opinions. Dialogue is a matter of principle because it involves reciprocity.

[Turan] You were a political refugee in Algeria between 1964 and 1967. Then you went to France after the coup of 19 June. Then, when you were pardoned by the king, you came back to Morocco. Why did you come back?

[Bensaïd] There was the so-called July 1963 conspiracy against the security of the state. I was wanted by Moroccan police, and a death sentence was issued

against me. Then I was pardoned. The charge was made against me because there were differences between me and the regime in Morocco, and our points of view varied. Then matters improved.

[Turan] I have been told that you called for a republic in Morocco.

[Bensaïd] I never did. I believe in a constitutional monarchy. I believe in democracy and in political pluralism. I believe in freedom.

#### Omnium To Establish Offshore Bank

92AF0732C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 22 Apr 92  
p 5

[Report from Rabat by Muhammad al-Sharqi: "ONA Plans Offshore Bank in Tangiers in Cooperation With Moroccan Commercial Bank"]

[Text] An official of Omnium North Africa (ONA) told AL-HAYAH that the group has decided to establish an international bank in the free zone in Tangier, in cooperation with Moroccan Commercial Bank, of which it is 34-percent owner, through its Diwan banking arm.

AL-HAYAH learned from informed sources that the new bank, to be created before year-end, will be called the International Bank of Tangier.

The decision by ONA and Moroccan Commercial Bank to establish an offshore bank in the financial free zone in Tangier is the third of its kind. Two major French banks also announced plans last week to open offshore branches in Tangier in cooperation with Moroccan banks.

Credit Lyonnais of France also plans an offshore bank in cooperation with the Bank of Morocco, of which the French bank is 50-percent owner. AL-HAYAH learned from banking sources that the new bank in Tangier will be 50-percent owned by Credit Lyonnais and 40-percent owned by the Bank of Morocco (Credit Du Maroc).

The Nacional Du Paris bank has also decided to open an affiliate offshore bank in Tangier in cooperation with the Moroccan Bank for Commerce and Industry. Another offshore bank in Tangier is being considered by French bank Societe Generale in cooperation with SGMB [Societe Generale Marocaine de Banques] bank of Morocco. The Jordanian-Moroccan owned Arab Bank also plans an offshore presence in Tangier.

The Moroccan Ministry of Finance has overseen the fiscal free zone project in Tangier since its ratification by Parliament last year. Ministry sources emphasize that no less than 20 international banks—mostly French, Spanish, Italian, German, Japanese, and American—have expressed willingness to open offshore branches in the fiscal zone in Tangier. The sources added that preparations for the zone are underway, and that it should be ready before year-end.

The Financial Free Zone Law stipulates that banks wishing to open offshore branches in Tangier should be of good international reputation and should put up initial capital of at least \$500,000. Once operating, those banks are to pay annual fees of \$25,000. The law allows offshore banks extensive privileges, including a tax haven, a free hand in managing their financial assets, and complete freedom to engage in partnerships and investment in ventures within Morocco.

The current inclination is for the establishment of offshore banks in cooperation between international and Moroccan banks, especially since eight Moroccan banks are owned by foreign banks, sometimes by up to 50 percent. International banks prefer to initially use Moroccan personnel and expertise, leaving overall supervision to headquarters.

The rush to announce the opening of offshore banks in Tangier is attributable, in the view of observers, to new economic trends in Morocco and to the projected free trade zone between Morocco and the European Community [EC]. Observers further believe that the expected rise in trade activity and the increased flow of European assets into the country would provide those banks with unique opportunities to expand their activities in Morocco and the rest of the Arab Maghreb.

Experts believe that the role of banks in the new relationship between Morocco and the EC will "be considerable, especially in financing foreign trade and funding export-oriented producing units."

On 4 May, Morocco and the EC are expected to begin another round of negotiations in Rabat on the free trade zone project proposed by the EC after the European Parliament turned down the fourth fiscal protocol (\$600 million) earlier this year.

### Export Figures for 1991-92 Contrasted

*92AF0896B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 29 May 92 p 19*

[Article: "1991 Exports Up 7 Percent Thanks to Clothing and Phosphoric Acid"]

[Text] It's not too late to take another look at 1991 exports. As we have already indicated, they showed significant growth last year, increasing from 34,857.6 million dirhams in 1990 to 37,283.3 million dirhams in 1991, a 7-percent increase, while imports for their part rose 4.7 percent.

Here are the highlights in the various sectors of activity:

#### 1.Food

- 1990: 8,635.7 million dirhams;
- 1991: 10,411.9 million dirhams.

The performance of the sector was impressive, with 20.6-percent growth, due to the following:

**Food Exports 1990-1991**  
(millions of dirhams)

	1990	1991
Plums	1,396.5	1,819.0
Crustaceans	1,756.9	2,729.4
Potatoes	156.5	353.3
Preserved fish	1,168.9	1,347.1
Tomatoes	389.9	467.7
Dried vegetables	103.1	175.6
Fish meal	139.4	167.7

On the other hand, several exports showed a marked decline from 1990 to 1991, in particular fish (1,389.0 to 1,205.1 million dirhams) and fruit juices (412.8 to 284.5 million dirhams).

**2.Energy:** Exports in this sector are necessarily limited. The leader was petroleum and lubricants: 905.6 million dirhams in 1991, compared to 1,104.7 in 1990.

**3.Unprocessed products:** There was significant decline in 1991:

- 1990: 1,484.8 million dirhams;
- 1991: 1,133.9 million dirhams.

This decline is mainly attributable to olive oil (down from 331.1 to 34.8 million dirhams) and pulp (411.3 down to 287.7 million dirhams).

**4.Mineral products:** This sector is dominated by phosphates, and the reduction here had a pronounced effect on the sector as a whole: Phosphates were down from 3,600 to 3,015.5 million dirhams; the total for the sector was down from 4,666 to 4,114.1 million dirhams.

Also in decline were the following products:

**Mineral Exports 1990-1991**  
(millions of dirhams)

	1990	1991
Copper ore	254.1	234.7
Lead ore	131.0	52.2
Scrap iron	70.4	40.1

At the same time, increases were seen in exports of barytes (126.6 to 165.1 million dirhams) and iron ore (11.8 to 29.4 million dirhams).

**5.Semimanufactured products:** The increase in this sector was linked to growth in industrial activity, especially the recovery in exports of phosphoric acid to India. Altogether, exports in this sector grew from 8,768.1 to 9,457.9 million dirhams between 1990 and 1991.

Phosphoric acid was primarily responsible for the upward trend, while lead and fertilizers were down:

Semimanufacture Exports 1990-1991 (millions of dirhams)		
	1990	1991
Phosphoric acid	2,868	3,716
Lead	396.6	274.7
Fertilizers	3,387	3,316

**6. Equipment:** Like energy, this is a rather small export sector. Overall, it showed significant growth (21.2 percent), increasing from 1,252.1 million dirhams in 1990 to 1,505.8 million in 1991.

**7. Consumer products:** This sector is up 10.3 percent, from 8,795.1 million dirhams in 1990 to 9,703.8 million in 1991.

Responsible for the growth were the following:

Consumer Goods Exports 1990-1991 (millions of dirhams)		
	1990	1991
Clothing	3,636.9	4,187.4
Hosiery	1,914.8	2,164.6
Footwear	646.5	707.3
Bedclothes	45.6	88.7
Perfumery	108	132.9
Auto spare parts	206.9	228.2

Showing a decline were:

Consumer Goods Exports 1990-1991 (millions of dirhams)		
	1990	1991
Leatherwear	363.3	334.0
Medicaments	187.7	150.3
Carpets	454.9	370.5
Cotton cloth	141.7	109.3

#### Country To Import 3 Million Tons of Wheat

92AF0732B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
15 Apr 92 p 66

[Text] National Inter-Professional de [word missing] of Morocco will import 3.2 million tons of grains from France and the U.S. in 1992 and has already contracted for the purchase of half that amount. A 27-percent increase in Moroccan imports, mandated by the drought, has firmed up world shipping and grain markets, according to informed sources. French wheat prices rose to \$160 from \$157.5 per ton in the second week of March. Dry weather is expected to reduce grain crops to half their 1991 level of 8.6 million tons.

#### Social, Economic Situation Blamed for Increased Crime

92AF0896A Rabat L'OPINION in French 28 May 92  
p 2

[Article by Mohamed Jhioui: "Young School Dropouts Blamed for Increasing Crime in Marrakech"]

[Text] Like the kingdom's other cities, Marrakech has not escaped the phenomenon of criminality, which more than ever is being discussed with an air of anxiety, even anguish to the point of obsession.

But the situation in our city is not as alarming as one might think, despite the slight increase in crime reported in recent years, mainly among those unable to continue with their studies. We are indebted to the police for statistical data concerning these social ills which have caused undue concern, since the rumor mill seems constantly to exaggerate the cases reported here and there—if not spread outright fantasies of every sort.

Granted, crime is increasing in our urban centers (Marrakech, Kelaa des Sraghna, Ben Guerir, and Imin Tanout), for the socio-economic reasons with which everyone is familiar. We would cite among others the drought that has ravaged the region for virtually a decade and which is taking its toll again this season; the resulting rural exodus; the unemployment increasing at a dizzying rate; the idleness of the hundreds of students drummed out of school at the end of each year; and the drug scourge, which is making inroads among our youth. There is also the outrageous and provocative exhibitionism of immensely wealthy individuals obsessed with showing off their "toys" without much concern for those who are down-and-out.

Such are the factors behind the increase in crime. Thank God we don't have in our country the kind of elaborate crime organizations that are prevalent elsewhere. Even so, it should be noted that the laxity of our judicial machinery and the scarcely orthodox behavior of certain officials tend to confirm people close to marginalization in the belief that there must always be some way to escape the clutches of the law. This is very harmful.

To return to the phenomenon of crime in Marrakech and its region, it will be noted there were 100 murders between 1986 and 1991: 17 of 17 cases were solved in 1986, 12 of 15 in 1987, 14 out of 22 in 1988, 21 out of 22 in 1989, 8 out of 10 in 1990, and 15 for 14 in 1991 (one case from the early 1980s was solved). That means that out of 100 cases reported, 87 were solved and the other 13 are still open.

With regard to the rate of success in apprehending malefactors, we see a significant improvement and excellent results: 83.94 percent in 1991, whereas the figure was on the order of 79.20 percent in 1986.

In the fight against drugs, too, we must give the SRPJ [judicial police] high marks for their work. In 1989, 615 cases were handled, and charges were filed against 724

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individuals. In the same year, 267,272 kg of "chira" [extract of kif mixed with tobacco], 63,232 kg of kif [cannabis] and 6,073 kg of tobacco were seized.

In 1990, 641 cases were handled, and charges were filed against 737 individuals. The quantities of drugs seized: 195,729 kg of chira, 69,397 kg of kif, and 9,006 kg of tobacco.

In 1991, 802 cases were handled, and charges were filed against 891 persons, with seizures totaling 103,726 kg of chira, 211,151 kg of kif, and 7,645 kg of tobacco.

Finally, in the first four months of this year, 264 cases have been handled, 298 charges have been filed, and seizures have totaled 21 kg of chira, 3,646 kg of kif and tobacco.

But how will things be with the advent of the six future urban communes—Menara and Gueliz (Menara prefecture), Medina and Kasba (Medina prefecture), and Palmeraie and Sidi Youssef Ben Ali (Sidi Youssef Ben Ali prefecture)—when the area of the urban periphery is tripled?

Perhaps the time has come for a dose of realism—not a crackdown, far from it, but the creation of jobs to resorb the unemployment. All of which means the remedy is a new economic policy that can improve the social, economic, athletic and cultural lives of our young people.

#### **Unions Renew Call for Collective Talks**

92AF0812B London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic  
12 May 92 p 4

[Unsigned article: "Following Refusal To Participate in May Parades: Moroccan Unions Renew Call for Social Dialogue"]

[Text] Rabat—Morocco's three unions—the General Union of Moroccan Workers, the Democratic Confederation of Labor, and the Union of Higher Education—have appealed to their government to conduct a genuine dialogue regarding demands contained in an urgent memorandum presented by the three to Prime Minister Dr. Azzedine Laraki.

The memorandum is being seen as the first indirect communication between the three unions and the government following the crisis that occurred when union official Muhammad Nubir al-Amawi was put on trial, and unions refused to participate in this year's Workers' Day parades on 1 May, protesting what they considered a restriction of their freedom to parade, after Moroccan authorities assigned specific locations where union members were to assemble.

The opposition newspaper *AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI* said that the social file should not be ignored, and that union demands should be the subject of a bold dialogue, adding that the government is being put to a real test, and that the unions will decide what has to be done based on the government's position. Union

demands are reported to center on improving wages and reconsidering laws and legislation for organizing labor in Morocco.

Elsewhere, Ahmad 'Usman, chairman of the National Grouping of Liberals [NGL], renewed his party's appeal for a dialogue to develop a national consensus on essential issues, expressing hope that all politicians would rise to the level of the historical stage through which the country is passing with a sense of patriotism, a view of the future, and by abandoning partisan behavior to reach accord on solutions to all problems on the table.

Speaking to a gathering of food merchants in Casablanca, 'Usman added that the NGL is trying to have the upcoming elections be clean and democratic.

Meanwhile, Moroccan political circles are awaiting the conclusions of the arbitration committee established by Morocco's monarch, King Hassan II, to review the dispute between the government and the opposition over election laws. In this same context, parliamentarians from the Istiqlal and Socialist Union parties are each holding a separate meeting, the nature of which is undisclosed.

## SUDAN

#### **News of al-Turabi Assault Reaches Khartoum**

92AF0863A London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic  
28 May 92 p 5

[Article: "Ottawa Airport Incident Reverberates in Khartoum"]

[Text] London—Khartoum—Sudanese first heard of the assault against Dr. Hasan al-Turabi on international radio broadcasts, and then through a statement issued by the General Secretariat of the Popular Islamic Conference, which is headed by Dr. al-Turabi and has its headquarters in Khartoum.

The general secretariat's statement, which Sudanese television broadcast yesterday (Sunday) evening, stated that al-Turabi "was subjected to a perfidious, criminal assault as he was preparing to leave Ottawa to give a lecture in Montreal."

The statement added that "the general secretariat humbles itself before God, the sublime and exalted, with thanks and praise, because the violent assault was detected, and because its known reach [madaha al-ma'lum] failed to extinguish the firebrand that burns with all that exasperates the enemies of Islam. The wounds were a penance and recompense God willing, another major disappointment for those who planned the criminal plot, and deeply grievous for those who stand in their ranks."

*AL-QUWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH* [Armed Forces newspaper] carried no report on the incident in its edition

issued yesterday in Khartoum. The official AL-INQADH AL-WATANI, which is close to Dr. al-Turabi, carried an editorial yesterday that states that the Sudanese are "naturally tolerant, and that this incident is foreign to the Sudanese political character and Sudanese political dealings."

AL-INQADH AL-WATANI also published a brief report stating that al-Turabi was subjected to an unfortunate incident. The report states that al-Turabi is in the hospital, and that his escort, Ahmad 'Uthman Makki, has left the hospital. AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH also published a brief report yesterday, which states that three Sudanese led the assault against al-Turabi. It described them as a "gang led by a karate practitioner known as Hashim Badr-al-Din."

The only known foreign reaction was published by the office of Islamic movement [parliament] deputies in Jordan. In a statement issued yesterday, the office deplored the assault against al-Turabi, stating that "the incident targeted innocent persons armed with ideas who seek the good of mankind."

The statement placed responsibility for the assault against Dr. al-Turabi on the Canadian Government. It called on that government to "take every possible measure to safeguard his life and uncover the criminal elements who planned and carried out this crime."

#### Comprehensive Strategy Conference Reviewed 92AF0860B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 26 May 92 p 6

[Article by Muhammad al-Shaykh Husayn: "Started in October With Participation of 6,580 Members and Divided into 52 Committees, Sudan's Comprehensive Strategy Conference Outlines Resource Utilization Planning Policy"]

[Text] Khartoum—Working sessions of the lengthiest conference in Sudan's history ended with passage of the comprehensive national strategy report after nine months of meetings and debates at sectorial and committee levels.

The conference began its sessions on 21 October 1991. A total of 6,580 members took part in the conference and were divided into 52 subcommittees covering 12 major sectors. The final report has taken the form of a volume of more than 250 large-size pages covering all aspects of life, beginning with morals and social progress strategy. The report devotes attention to mapping strategy and to information on the land. It talks about voluntary work and refers to the population and it has not neglected Sudan's movie industry and documentary films, either.

This strategy, to be implemented during the 1992-2002 year period, is estimated to cost more than 7,000 billion Sudanese pounds [rough equivalent of \$70 billion].

It is expected that implementation will begin with the onset of the current budget for fiscal 1992-93 which starts next July.

The strategy says that the current budget reflects the comprehensive program, which incorporates economic policies in all domains, as a particular economic step that seeks to accomplish objectives of the comprehensive national strategy.

In this review, we have put the emphasis on the sectors connected with economy and the society and we will then go back to the political aspects.

Dr. Sayf-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad, the conference rapporteur, director of the Strategic Studies Sector, and the man who supervised this conference, defines [strategy] as the comprehensive beginning to entrench intellectual renaissance and cultural development.

He also views it as comprehensive planning that encompasses all sectors of the Sudanese society harmoniously and concordantly to achieve complete renaissance and the major leap for which the Sudanese people aspire.

Dr. Ahmad adds that it is a comprehensive plan for the ideal utilization of the resources and capacities with which the country abounds, not to mention that it is an ambitious plan that revives hope and renews confidence in the capabilities of this generous country.

Concluding his statement, Dr. Ahmad says that strategy is a map guiding the cultural transformation toward the society for which we aspire.

The holding of such conferences is nothing new in Sudan. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has seen a number of programs and varied projects to accelerate its growth rates, including the 10-year, 1960-70, plan; the five-year, 1970-75, plan; the six-year, 1981-86, plan; the four-year, 1987-91 program; and the three-year, 1989-92, salvation program.

In actual development, the harvest from these plans has been very meager. In fact, most of them have not met the cost of the ink with which they were written. Therefore, the Sudanese mentality is inclined to believe that such conferences are retreats for society's upper crust to engage in elegant conversation and, most often, to produce at the top theoretical and academic reports that are divorced from the real situation.

#### Strategy's New Elements

Is this strategy characterized by new elements that distinguish it from past experiments?

Dr. Ahmad has said that this strategy is greatly different from past experiments. It is, to start, an original major plan to touch off all of society's creative capabilities and to achieve self-reliance in the collective sense of both natural resources and spiritual and moral capabilities. It is tantamount to society's large-scale movement to plan for itself, not just the movement of the government and

its bureaucratic agencies. It is founded on disseminating the liberties, it has benefited from past experiences and has steered away from offering a specific model.

But what is actually new in this strategy is the attention it devotes for the first time to all dimensions of the citizen in his capacity as a fundamental pivot around which the programs and plans revolve. It has harmonized spiritual needs with the necessities of life and progress. It has established moral, intellectual, cultural, educational, health, and environmental frameworks with as much attention as it has devoted to the economy, agriculture, industry, energy, and mining.

Dr. Ahmad has offered a fourth reason that makes this strategy unique, saying that it has set clear qualitative and quantitative objectives on which the plans are founded. It has also determined a known time frame within which the work is to be accomplished. It has established indicators and criteria by which to measure work and performance. This strategy is distinguished from others by the harmony it has established among its plans for the various sectors in accordance with a comprehensive and unifying philosophy that binds the origins with the present and the future, that links the here with the hereafter, and that mobilizes society's capabilities to accomplish the strategic objectives.

### Social Development

In the social domain, the conference report stresses that religiously, morally, culturally, in living quality, and environmentally, Sudan must be the best among the developing world societies. It must be independent of the government in most of its needs and its initiatives must precede those of the government.

Generally, the recommendations for this sector call for implanting high morals and for eliminating social injustice and discrimination among people on the basis of religion, race, or culture. This sector devotes attention to combating poverty through the productive families program and social solidarity. In quantitative terms, the objective is to provide two million families with the means of production, at the rate of 200,000 families annually, at a total cost of nearly 20 billion Sudanese pounds.

Several recommendations deal with child welfare exclusively. Most significant among them are the recommendations to complete creation of the National Child Welfare Council, to set up council branches in the provinces, and to complete the legislative framework that ensures children's rights and secures their basic needs. Quantitatively, the strategy calls for implementing a family reunification plan that seeks to provide shelter to 36,000 homeless people.

In the social solidarity area, the strategy seeks to cover all 100 percent of the citizens with a social security umbrella and to disseminate social solidarity awareness by organizing 500 seminars and 100 public lectures annually in the educational institutions, producing 20

movie films, 10 television series, and 5 million educational pamphlets, and encouraging writing by publishing 5 million books annually.

In the area of health development, the strategy seeks to reduce child mortality causes to less than 20 percent [as published], to vaccinate all children, to rehabilitate hospitals, to provide hospital beds at the international rate of three beds per 1,000 citizens, to wipe out endemic and contagious diseases and diseases emanating from malnutrition.

In the educational sector, the strategy calls for spreading basic education to all parts of Sudan before the year 2000, for promulgating a law that makes this education compulsory, and for adopting a comprehensive program that couples theoretical and applied studies with training.

In the area of higher education, interest in technological education is prominent. The strategy calls for establishing 25 engineering institutes, 25 agricultural institutes, 15 health institutes, and 12 business institutes.

In the sports sector, the strategy stresses that it is a means to raise citizens who are strong in body and morals and it has called for building and completing the Sudan Sports City by the end of the plan.

As for population, Sudan's population problem highlights the incompatibility of the economic growth with the constant population growth, low population characteristics, and an unbalanced population distribution. The population strategy proposes practical plans to solve the above problems.

### Culture and Information Sector

The cultural revival and irradiation strategy calls for protecting the Sudanese identity and society's cultural entity against usurpation and for achieving Sudan's cultural security. Regarding daily cultural activity to revive literature throughout the country, the strategy calls for holding 34,000 (revival sessions) and organizing 60 processions and 180 cultural rallies during the plan years. In the area of formative art, the strategy calls for holding 10,000 formative [art] activities and organizing 240 art fairs in 10 years.

As for music and singing, the strategy calls for organizing 10,000 revival activities as part of constant programs and 360 provincial activities, for issuing a music and song magazine, and for establishing a music and singing award.

Regarding the theatre, the strategy calls for organizing 10,000 activities and 60 revival sessions as part of constant programs, for 240 theatrical works in the provinces, for issuing a theatre magazine and establishing a theatre award. It also calls for producing 50 short and full-feature creative films and 100 documentary films in 10 years.

As for publication, the strategy calls for printing 1,000 Sudanese books in 10 years, for organizing a Sudanese book fair in Khartoum every four months and an annual fair in the provinces. In information, the strategy has embraced the principle of social responsibility so that the media will play a role in guidance, education, recreation, and comprehensive social development while adhering to the Islamic Shari'a as a reference and bolstering the national unity.

Regarding the press, the strategy stresses free thought and expression, protection of the press, diversification, and the right to choose, whether intellectually or in terms of press ownership, management, and specialization. This freedom is tied to the controls of social responsibility and the freedom of the press is fully tied to its responsibility. The strategy further calls for issuing a press law which emphasizes the authority and role of the press, opens the door for the creation of press houses and establishments within the context of public and private efforts, and provides for the creation of a higher press council controlled by the legislative authority.

Regarding broadcasting, the strategy seeks to spread national information sovereignty over every inch of the homeland by developing radio transmission by the end of the strategy years. As for television, the strategy calls for using all the means available currently to ensure that television transmission reaches all populated areas by the end of the period of this strategy. In the area of information, the strategy recommends the creation of a national documentation center and a public-opinion measuring agency.

#### Economic Strategy

The economic strategy's entire framework is founded on seeking justice, equality, self-reliance, and liberalization of the national economy.

This latest framework relies on abolishing restrictions on foreign currency transactions and on freeing price systems from administrative control.

The strategy calls for floating the Sudanese pound so that its real value will be established by the market mechanisms of a free market. It also calls for ending the financing of nonproduction transactions, such as the purchase of land and real estate, speculation in foreign currency, and all transactions concerned with hoarding and accumulating goods and siphoning them out of the market. It also calls for putting an end to financing the deficit of the unstrategic public sector units and for getting rid of them immediately by either selling or liquidating them. The strategy further calls for devising new systems to encourage saving and to attain tenfold the current saving rates and for developing a national plan to combat unemployment.

The economic performance objectives are to increase the national income twentyfold, checks issued by the banking units fiftyfold, the insurance volume tenfold, and investment savings fiftyfold.

Development planning is based on promoting both crop and livestock aspects of the agricultural sector and on giving high priority to oil and mineral exploration and exploitation activities. The fiscal policy seeks to increase the federal government's average intrinsic revenues by 25 percent the gross national product, provided that the federal government expenditures do not exceed 20 percent the gross national product.

Regarding tax reform, the strategy calls for amending the tax laws and policies and the taxing, auditing, and accounting procedures in a fundamental way in order to enable the tax agency to reach all capable taxpayers.

Regarding customs and production fees, the strategy calls for reexamining the brackets from time to time in accordance with the developments, for expanding application of the sales tax, for strengthening the smuggling control agencies, and for increasing the number of free markets.

In the area of investment, the strategy calls for attracting foreign loans and aid, eliminating dual taxation, and opening up to the world with the objective of regaining the foreign investor's confidence.

#### Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector

The strategy participates in reaffirming the importance of this sector and its vanguard role, considering that it contributes 36 percent the gross domestic product, absorbs 75 percent of the workforce, and contributes nearly 95 percent of the export value. This sector gets 26 percent of the appropriations for development programs.

The guidelines for this sector are embodied in calling for exploiting the available resources ideally, preserving the environmental balance, increasing productivity by introducing sophisticated irrigation, soil, and production technology, introducing mechanization, and encouraging and aiding small farmers.

In the area of irrigated agriculture, the strategy seeks to increase the irrigated acreage threefold and dryland farming tenfold. It also seeks to increase the production of food cereals sixfold and of oil seeds fivefold and to diversify other crops, such as aromatic plants, and double their production volume, at least. It seeks, moreover, to increase the number of people trained in agriculture fivefold.

Regarding livestock resources, the strategy seeks to increase them threefold and to increase exports from livestock resources twentyfold, to eliminate endemic and contagious livestock diseases, and to develop the fish industry.

As for drinking water, the strategy seeks to eliminate thirst for man and animal finally by the end of the strategy period, to observe health and environmental controls in water purification, and to protect water sources from pollution.

The strategy includes detailed programs to achieve the desired development in this sector according to a schedule that ends by the end of the plan in the year 2002.

#### **Industry and Mining Sector**

The report on this sector begins with a lengthy introduction on the importance of industry. Food industries lead the objectives of this sector and the strategy calls for establishing small plants to produce 175,000 tons of (al-qawr?) sugar as a first phase and then to build new sugar plants to produce 2.1 million tons of sugar for export in the next phase.

In the area of the drug industry, the strategy calls for self-sufficiency in basic drugs (240 varieties of drugs) produced in various pharmaceutical forms in the initial phase. It calls for exporting drugs in the next phase.

In mining, the strategy is based on assessing and exploiting raw materials used in the cement industry to achieve self-sufficiency.

#### **Transport and Communications Sector**

In this sector, the strategy devotes attention to developing the means of transportation by focusing on increasing the length of the existing railroad network threefold, by linking it with the neighboring countries, and by increasing its shipping capacity twentyfold. As for roads and bridges, the strategy seeks to increase the length of the existing road network so it will be linked to all eight neighboring countries and to build bridges across the Nile and its main tributaries in the highly populated production areas.

Regarding maritime transportation, the strategy seeks to increase the current maritime fleet fivefold and to rehabilitate Port Sudan and Port Sawakin. As for river transport, the strategy seeks to increase the current capacity twentyfold. It also seeks to develop the oil pipeline so it can respond to the growing transportation needs.

In the area of post, telegraph, and telephone, the strategy seeks to cover all major cities and villages with these services.

By reviewing the figures contained in the recommendations, the real situation, and the living resources, one can determine whether this conference's recommendations will, like other Sudanese plans, remain captives of the academic mentality.

#### **Budget Speech Before TNA Summarized**

92AF0863C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
24 May 92 p 9

[Text] Sudan expects to receive \$431 million in export revenues and spend \$2.168 billion on imports. This was announced by Finance Minister 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi

in a budget speech, which he delivered to the Transitional National Assembly [TNA] yesterday.

He stated that the 1992-93 budget anticipates revenues totalling 73.711 billion Sudanese pounds and expenditures totaling 98.7 billion pounds. He added that the development budget totals 50.7 billion pounds, the defense budget will increase from 7 billion to 20 billion pounds, the deficit will drop from 84 billion to 34 billion pounds, and section-one expenditures (wages) will total 7.369 billion pounds, so that the minimum wage in the new fiscal year will increase from 1,500 pounds per month to 2,000 pounds per month, and salaries less than 2,500 pounds [per month] will be completely exempt from income tax. The defense tax will drop from 40 percent to 20 percent.

The minister announced that national product will increase from 404 billion pounds to 656 billion pounds. The general budget and the development budget totals 156.438 billion pounds, an increase of 113.400 billion pounds compared to the previous year's budget.

The finance minister stated that the expected deficit will total 82 billion pounds. However, he will strive to reduce it to 34 billion pounds through financing from the African Development Bank and the domestic equivalent of commodity loans from Pakistan and Malaysia.

In the development budget, which has been increased by 525 percent, 16 billion pounds have been designated for the agricultural sector, 14.4 billion for the transportation sector, 5.4 billion for the energy and mining sector, 4 billion for the water sector, 8.3 billion for the social development sector, 1.5 billion for the state industrial sector, 2.4 billion for the development of the provinces, and 3.7 billion as a reserve and for reconstruction programs. The foreign currency balance totals \$2.387 billion; total foreign currency sources amount to \$1.6 billion for a deficit of \$775 million.

#### **Conversion to Dinar Currency Analyzed**

92AF0860A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
26 May 92 p 14

[Article by Muhammad al-Hasan Ahmad: "Contradiction Between al-Turabi Statements and 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi Statements on Economic Situation; Reasons for Converting Sudanese Pound to Dinar"]

[Text] Muhammad al-Hasan Ahmad has written from London about Sudan's economic situation, saying that many reasons are behind converting the name of the country's currency to the dinar. He mentions these reasons in the following analysis:

Despite the numerous conflicting statements made by Dr. al-Turabi during his tour of Britain and the United States and the conflicting statements by prominent Sudanese officials, one statement in particular has aroused the disapproval, amazement, and sadness of all Sudanese, excluding the top segment of the Islamic

National Front [INS] and its elite capitalists in particular. In this statement, al-Turabi says: "Sudan, with its Islamic strength, has been able to liberate its economy from everything. It has floated its currency and lowered prices." (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 15 May 1992, citing a press conference in Washington).

If we may, without embarking on any distortion and while being guided by the logic of what the regime's finance minister said in an interview which was published by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on 28 April 1992, i.e., just two weeks prior to al-Turabi's statement, we would be awed by the difference between the two statements and the two logics. What did Finance Minister 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi say in that press interview? He said that like other people, he had no explanation for the phenomenon of the Sudanese citizens' perplexing adaptation to the country's high cost of living. But within the context of alleviating the Sudanese people's living crisis, he promised to introduce a tax system that exempts the overwhelming majority of low-income state employees from personal income tax.

To start, one is entitled to ask: Which of the two men was true to himself in his statements? Was it the finance minister or was it Dr. al-Turabi, leader of the Islamic political movements who is marketing and promoting these movements in the west these days, riding the horse of the government in Khartoum and citing this government as the ideal model of government for the fundamentalist or opportunistic movements, whichever name applies?

If one rises above revilement and characterizations and allows one's self to be guided by each man's specialization, one can say immediately that the finance minister was true to himself when he expressed his perplexity and his amazement at how the Sudanese people have adapted to the high cost of living. That perplexity was made even greater by his admission that he did not know the reasons, even though it is his most essential duty to know these things best by virtue of the cabinet ministry that he runs. Perhaps the minister's perplexity and questions are sincere because the distance between the elite in the top INS flight and the lower classes has become so great that there is no link between them now that the middle class has dropped to the bottom or, if we wish to be precise, has dropped to the surface of the bottom. Thus, the successive contact links between the bottom, the middle, and the top have disappeared!

Therefore, it is our duty to decipher this perplexity by saying that the Sudanese used to have three meals daily and that what used to be called the upper class (excluding the INS people) now gets one meal daily, or two meals at best. As for what used to be called the middle class, which now floats at the top of the lower class, it lives on a single meal. As for those who are politely called limited-income people, they may, at best, taste a single meal a day; if they are fortunate and if things go smoothly for them—"silence the dogs of hunger," as our good kinsmen say—or they get a meal every other

day. Yet, al-Turabi, and the regime people behind him, blame western organizations and countries for alleging falsely that there is starvation in Sudan!

This is the truth, and this is the sad answer we give the finance minister, perhaps it will decipher some of the mysteries of his perplexity. As for Dr. al-Turabi in his capacity as an international leader, we will forego burdening him with specific questions about the Sudanese people's condition. Speaking of the Sudanese people, al-Turabi has said that with the power of political Islam, his regime has reduced the burden of prices for them. Then let us ask him an international question that befits his leadership status: Can he show us in any part of the world as wide a gap as that which exists in Sudan between the minimum wage, which is 1,500 pounds monthly, and the minimum cost of living which, according to economists' estimates, is 18,000 pounds monthly for a family of two, keeping in mind that the average family size in Sudan is five members. Perhaps we will hear from him better revelations about the Sudanese people than those he has already made! Despite all the bitter and painful facts that have contradicted the doctor's allegation that the Sudanese regime has lowered prices, Dr. al-Turabi has also spoken about another accomplishment made by the regime which he guides, namely floating the Sudanese pound. Even though he has not explained the benefit of this flotation and even though he has been content to say that it is one of the regime's most important accomplishments, we cannot but, with utter regret, announce to the entire world that the Sudanese pound has drowned to death because it has been floated without being given any oars to take it to the safety of the shore. It has gone with regret and it will be taken out of currency circulation market because it has dropped to the level of less than one piaster or, according to another story, to less than one mil [per pound]. Only God knows. So that the regime can bury the Sudanese pound in a non-Muslim cemetery, it has claimed that it has issued a new currency based on the dinar. Governor of the Bank of Sudan has said: "The new dinar seeks to apply and entrench the Islamic system and to reduce currency printing which costs from \$83 million annually to \$30 million."

According to Dr. al-Turabi's logic, floating the Sudanese pound has led to its disappearance, despite the international weight the pound had enjoyed and even though until not long ago, it was equal in value to the pound sterling or even greater. Now that the pound sterling has come to equal 200 Sudanese pounds since the flotation, the Sudanese pound has died. But the regime insists that it has created the Islamic alternative with what it calls the dinar and that the value of the dinar, according to the government proclamation, equals that of 10 pounds. The purpose of this ingenious idea is to surpass the comparisons with the Sudanese pound's actual value when the INS seized power. At the time, the value of a dollar in the black market amounted to no more than 12 pounds, whereas a dollar is worth more than 100 pounds now. The purpose is also to make it easier to deceive, through

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comparison, considering that the value of the issued dinar is 10 pounds. Thus, it can be said figuratively that the value of a dollar is 10 dinars.

Perhaps governor of the Bank of Sudan was also true in his statement when he said that printing dinars will reduce the cost of currency printing from \$83 million to \$30 million. But what the governor has not revealed, out of modesty, is that the actual cost of printing paper money of the one-pound and lesser denominations is higher than the purchasing power of these denominations. This is why the regime has decided to convert from the Sudanese pound—whose value has dropped to just one piaster, or even one mil, according to some economists—as a name and a symbol to the dinar which is equal to 10 pounds in value.

The objective sought by the regime through this ingenious conversion is evident in three aspects which we will list in the following:

The first aspect is to mislead the world into believing that the dollar is not worth more than 10 dinars so as to hide the distance existing currently between the dollar and the Sudanese pound—keeping in mind that the dollar is worth 100 pounds—and the distance existing in the early 1980's when the dollar was worth three pounds.

The second aspect is to mislead the Sudanese, using the "Islamic" media in particular, into believing that converting the currency name from pound to dinar is done on the path of Islamizing the currency.

The third aspect is [to convince others] that as soon as it was converted from pound to dinar, the currency gained strength and ability in domestic and international transactions whereas the opposite is absolutely true. Perhaps the only benefit from this step is to reduce the cost of currency printing, considering that it will save nearly \$50 million. Otherwise, what one man arriving recently from Sudan said about the step is true. This man has said that every day his wife puts 10,000 pounds in her bag and proceeds to the market and returns home carrying in that

bag goods that do not exceed in size the size of the currency she taken to market. This sum equals the monthly salary of three prominent state employees put together. This man, considered to be a well-to-do man, has said to me: Do not be surprised. The total water bill amounts to more than 20,000 pounds monthly. He also said that his car, using three gallons of benzine daily, costs nearly 10,000 pounds a day. The man went on to list the essential expenses of a well-to-do man, amounting to more than 200,000 monthly, concluding that Sudan's wealthy are on their way to poverty and that the condition of Sudan's poor is indescribable. Yet, Dr. al-Turabi has the audacity to say in Washington that prices have dropped and that floating the currency has been an accomplishment. My interlocutor was perhaps true when he said that one of the benefits of abolishing the pound is to reduce the weight of the heaps of currency that had to be carried and to facilitate computations by reducing the number of zeroes.

Perhaps what has amazed me most in what I have heard from informed sources is that the government has begun to discriminate in dealing with state employees, especially in dealing with active members which the INS has brought back from abroad or with INS members whose contracts have been terminated by some Arab countries. The government has devised a new form for dealing with such groups, calling them "private contractors," as if they are foreign experts. In such contracts, a contractor's salary may amount to tenfold the salary collected by a similar resident Sudanese employee. Moreover, there is a certain category which is paid in hard currency! Thus, the INS interests are now integrated between the INS capitalists who have gained control of all aspects of the commerce and INS employees to whom the INS has devoted special and intensive care. As for the Sudanese people, they are done for, and it is as if the government is not closely or remotely concerned with them.

As for the saying that "nothing lasts," it is not in the regime's dictionary. Sudan has God to safeguard it and Islam has God to protect it from the claims of impostors who arrogate Islam without a right and without regard for Islam's teachings and virtuous values.

## BANGLADESH

### Government Faulted for Opposing People's Courts

92AS0898A Dhaka SANGBAD in Bengali 11 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by Saiyd Ali Kabir: "People's Court and Democracy"]

[Text] When rain comes after a long period of drought, the world of plants and trees suddenly looks fresh and lively as if receiving a new lease on life. Similarly, the People's Court of Bangladesh brought a new wave of joy to the minds of the people. Those who wanted the trial of the "Rajakars" showed their feelings. They think that if the wheel of the liberation war and democracy were allowed to turn full circle, the matter should have been like this. If the new generation of Bangladeshis who were children during the liberation war or were born after independence, did not stand behind this People's Court, this matter would not have appeared as a challenge to the nation.

The government is the opposition party of the People's Court. They are seeing the matter from a different perspective. The whole thing seems poisonous to them. It may seem to them that in a place where democracy was flourishing slowly, suddenly all the good results are about to be washed out by the force of flood waters.

At present, we are living between those two conflicts. The matter is taking a serious shape. Because those who are supporting this People's Court are undoubtedly honest, patriotic, and democratically minded people. Even the government does not have a different view about this matter. They said that if the People's Court was called as people's assembly, they could be flexible. But those who pulled the consciousness of the liberation war to such a height by placing the issue of the People's Court in their front, cannot retreat at the moment of the highest excitement in the war.

Now two things are to be considered. If the People's Court is against the democratic process, it is desirable to step back. If not, then why retreat? The government has taken the position that the matter is against the democratic process of the country. Personally, I am in favor of the People's Court. But who is right or who is wrong—this decision lies in the hands of the nation's judges. Only they can make the final decision about this matter. Only they can make the decision that could satisfy both the parties. The ruling of the highest court of the nation is binding on the country.

The greatest example of the judiciousness of the highest court can be found in the ruling of the divisional writ bench of the high court. They cooled down the atmosphere by pumping out some hot air.

I like to cite an example. One person of the revolutionary movement of Wales said that he did not like the British court. As soon as he said that, the famous justice Lord Vening immediately issued a warrant against him. The

judge had the opportunity to punish this person. He did not travel that road. He said that after appearing in the court, the accused had agreed to obey the authority of the court. So, the accused was released after being warned to behave in the future. Characteristically, the problem of the People's Court and the other problems are not the same. Whatever complaint may arise, those who are holding the People's Court, they have not denied the authority of the legal court. They said that it was a symbolic trial. The rest of the work should be done by the judicial system of the country.

Here lie the complications. The government argues that the verdict given after the trial was beyond the jurisdiction of the People's Court. But Begum Jahanara Imam said that the People's Court was symbolic. Does the verdict go against the symbolism of the People's Court? If not, there is no conflict between the People's Court and democracy.

If after the verdict of the People's Court, people had chased Golam Azam with arms, then in that case, the People's Court might have been considered as a parallel institution with the judiciary system of the nation and, surely, dangerous. If any government takes the verdict of the People's Court in a literal sense, that government should be considered crazy. But can you reject the inner meaning and implications of the People's Court? It means that the People's Court proved that Golam Azam is not above trial for his activities during the period of the liberation war.

Some people argued that Bangabandhu Shiekh Mujibur Rahaman offered general clemency after forgetting what happened in the past. I like to make a single comment on this debatable issue. True, Bangabandhu offered general clemency. But it is also correct that he took out the citizenship of Golam Azam. Now the matter went to the court. But above all, what is to be mentioned is that he legally prohibited racial or communal politics in Bangladesh. When that condition no longer exists, the general clemency of Bangabandhu becomes meaningless. What I mean by this is you cannot take advantage of all the different circumstances at the same time. This question should not have arisen today if the opposite party was sorry and repentant for the activities during the year 1971.

It should be mentioned here that the Japanese Emperor publicly apologized to Korea for Japanese activities during World War II. But Pakistan did not do anything like that. They did not, because Pakistan did not follow the path of democracy as did Japan. In our case the result was opposite. The tragic memory of 1971 has been washed out by the victory of Pakistan in the World Cup cricket tournament. There is nothing wrong because the tremendous victory of Pakistan in the World Cup would make any sports lover happy. But a different situation was created with a mixture of sports and politics. The joy of victory faded quickly, because the next day was the historic 26th March.

Twenty-one years ago, that particular day was totally different. The nation was under the control of a foreign country. Today, we are full of confidence. Now, those who brought the victory of democracy in 1990 are in conflict. It appears that a boxing game is going on inside the ring. Let us hope that the game does not turn to be a suicidal one.

Now, I will come to a different subject. On last 31 March, the chief presidency magistrate issued a statement in the newspaper. I will not try here to evaluate the statement. But two questions come to my mind. The first one is, can the magistrate tell this thing outside the court? He definitely has the right to speak from his own perspective inside the court while interpreting laws. The merit of his views would be judged by the highest court if it came to them.

My second question is very important. If the jurisdiction of the magistrates is not separated from the judiciary, it will create serious problems. The newspaper interview of the magistrate of 31st March will make this point clear. As I do not know much about it, I do not want to discuss the matter where the contempt of court began or ended. But the matter should come to the serious attention of the proper authorities and they should analyze it thoroughly.

On 1 April, the information minister told reporters that because the matter of the People's Court went to the court of law, we should refrain from making any comment about that. I did not properly understand the statement of the minister. True, the matter of the People's Court went to the court of law, but does it mean that in a democratic society people do not have the right to express their opinion regarding the matter? But how far it is consistent with law, that matter would be decided by the court and the decision of the court would be binding. It is good to express a more honest opinion about the People's Court, which could help the judge to reach a proper decision. But what is not good here is to express a false opinion to mislead the judge to understand the true feeling of the country. I understand the anxiety of the elderly people of the nation who are 50 years and above regarding this matter, and, in fact, I have great respect for their opinion. But it seems to me that they do not understand the relations between the People's Court and democracy. They do not realize that democracy is not like that of a train that would run smoothly on the rail. Rather, it is something like crossing a stormy ocean. You sail through a turbulent sea with more caution. I hope that one day we will reach a quiet ocean. Sometimes, stormy winds may come and shake the boat, but at least we would move forward. I do not know when that time will come. But if the democratic process exists and it can relate to the welfare of the people, I am positive that day must come.

Unfortunately, since 1958 there is no history of the cultivation of democracy in this country. The violent circumstances under which this nation was born were

not favorable for democracy. Even in England, democracy was in crisis when Oliver Cromwell emerged. Although he gave leadership in the civil war to placing the authority of the parliament over the crown. As we move forward leaving behind the past, the process of democracy will be strengthened. Because the present generation was the real power behind the democratic movement, they are more aware of its importance and they will try to strengthen it at any cost. They are more aware of the relation between the democracy and the rule of law than the previous generation. The People's Court caused more anxiety in the conservative class of people who gained wealth and respect in society in an honest or dishonest way for the last 32 years. They do not have any respect for the new generation. They never try to understand democracy with the eyes of the new generation.

Democracy is a dialectic process. But it has a condition. We cannot make a hole in the body of the boat we are sailing. The boat will remain intact if we can keep the nation free of illegal arms and establish an independent rule of law.

The shape of democracy to the older generation of our country is similar to six blind philosophers seeing an elephant. They can feel different parts of it, but not the whole thing. Here lies the advantage of the generation that was born during or after the war of liberation. They realize the legal side of democracy much better.

The democratic countries of the Western world, which help us, will not be afraid of our People's Court. The burning of the national flag does not fall in the category of sedition in the United States—this example had been cited by barrister Ishtiaq Ahmed in his argument before the supreme court. The Western countries are, rather, afraid of that irresponsible group of people who steal money from the banks, and destroy the law-and-order situation for their own interests. Both of these groups squeezed out the government treasury. These people who want to strengthen democracy with the help of a symbolic People's Court, are not like those persons.

The democratic process, which began in 1990, should continue for 20 or 25 years. After that we will be able to wash out the dirt of the past. Sometimes our clothing may catch some dirt, but we have to wash it. But since 1958, it never became so dirty. After watching this new generation, I have come to this conclusion. The other powerful wing is the women's community of the country. Our women's community advanced a lot due to the liberal revolution in our country. The example of it is extremely evident in middle-class society.

The generation is singing "If nobody comes after listening to you, you must move forward alone." When people sing this song in chorus, it becomes the song of the people. I understood the existentialism of Satre through this song. In the final analysis, every man is alone and has to decide and take full responsibility for that decision. But when all people make that decision, it becomes the decision of the people. For that reason Satre

took part in the French liberation movement against the Nazis. This inspiration strengthened our liberation war and the movement for democracy. The same process worked behind the People's Court. Whether it has any conflict with the rule of law or not, that decision would come from the supreme court of the nation, which was also strengthened by this democratic process.

A new kind of excitement came to the country with the People's Court. Those who are in front of the people's movement have opened the doors for the coming of fresh air. The country is enjoying the light and the fresh air of democracy with deep breaths. They are not fighting against the government or against the judicial system of the country. They are in favor of the ideals of the war of liberation.

The ruling class of the world always ask people to obey the rule of law. But what is rule of law in a democracy is a difficult question. Where rule of law is oppressive and where it is not—it is very difficult to arrive at a just decision. But democracy always looks for the answer. There is no end to this quest. It goes on and on forever. And there is no accurate answer. If we get the answer, it means we have reached the end of our objectives and ideals. Democratic society does not accept the end. If you reach the end, it would be the end of the ever moving democratic process.

#### Agreement Reached on Refugees From Burma

##### Foreign Ministers Meet Press

92AS1019A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 29 Apr 92 pp 1, 20

[Text] Myanmar military government has finally agreed to take back thousands of Rohingya Muslim refugees who crossed over to Bangladesh since early last year. Rangoon also assured Dhaka of a peaceful border to improve Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relations.

After a four-day hectic negotiations that began in Dhaka on Friday, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw signed an agreement on Tuesday with his Bangladesh counterpart Mr A.S.M. Mustafizur Rahman for the repatriation of the Rohingya Muslims, beginning in three weeks time and to be completed in six months. Another agreement was signed on the day Bangladesh Ambassador to Rangoon, Mr Mustafa Farooq Mohammad and the Myanmar Ambassador in Dhaka, Soe Myint, to work out the modalities of the repatriation.

Addressing a joint press conference at the State Guest House "Meghna" after the signing of the two agreements, Foreign Minister Mr A.S.M. Mustafizur Rahman and his Myanmar counterpart U Ohn Gyaw expressed their satisfaction over the outcome of their talks in resolving the Rohingya repatriation issue "amicably and in a spirit of understanding and goodwill".

"Don't you see us smiling" was the reply of Foreign Minister A.S.M. Mustafizur Rahman when asked whether he was happy with the agreement. "I now feel more comfortable after the agreement and we want to remain as good neighbors", he added turning to his Myanmar counterpart who nodded smilingly without making any comment.

Foreign Minister A.S.M. Mustafizur Rahman hoped that 2,23,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees who crossed over to Bangladesh so far would be repatriated to their homelands in Myanmar. But the Myanmar Foreign Minister said "there is no ceiling or figure who will be repatriated".

He clarified "we shall take back those who can prove their identity". When his attention was drawn to the fact that many Rohingya refugees claimed that their necessary papers were taken away by Myanmar troops, Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw said that even those who could at least give an account where they lived inside Myanmar would be considered for the repatriation.

The Myanmar Foreign Minister denied the allegations that the Rohingya Muslims were being persecuted inside his country. "There was no persecuting—this is misinformation and misconception", he asserted.

Asked whether the Myanmar troops along the Bangladesh border would be withdrawn and the tension will defuse, Mr Mustafizur Rahman came up with a quick reply "there is now troops deployment". His Myanmar counterpart also denied reports of massing troops by his country saying "there is no deployment of unreasonable number of troops along the border, whatever troops are there it is as per international law".

Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman reiterated that they wanted a quick repatriation and for that he said "we are trying to build up a congenial atmosphere for voluntary and peaceful repatriation of Rohingya refugees". Replying to a question of what action would be taken if the refugees refused to go back voluntarily, he said "we can't drive them out from our soil but we shall try to create a congenial atmosphere for their return".

The Myanmar Foreign Minister assured that there would be no problem in rehabilitating the refugees as "they will return to their homeland and take up their own vocations". He did not feel any necessity of assistance from any quarter for the rehabilitation of the refugees after the repatriation. "We have experience in this regard," he said referring to the repatriation of Rohingya refugees in 1978-79.

Home Minister Abdul Matin Chowdhury, State Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation Mr Luftur Rahman Khan, Additional Foreign Secretary Farooq Sobhan and A.H. Mahmud Ali, Bangladesh Ambassador to Myanmar, Mustafa Farooq Mohammad, BDR [Bangladesh Rifles] Chief Major General Abdul Latif and other senior officials were present at the Press conference.

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Myanmar Information Minister Brigadier General Myo Thant and Myanmar Ambassador in Dhaka U Soe Myint were present at the press conference on behalf of the 14-member delegation that took part in the negotiations during the last four days.

Under the agreement, the Myanmar Government agreed to take "all necessary measures that would halt the outflow of Myanmar residents to Bangladesh and encourage those who had left Myanmar to return voluntarily and safely to their homes". It has agreed to repatriate the refugees in batches and take back those who hold identity cards, national registration cards and other documents issued by the relevant Myanmar authorities.

The repatriation of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh will begin on May 15. Bangladesh will open 10 transit camps while Myanmar will set up five reception camps to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees. About 5000 refugees, 500 from each transit camp, will be repatriated every alternate day and the repatriation will be over in six months. Both sides will designate officials who will have authority from their respective governments to resolve any problem that may crop up during the repatriation process.

The Myanmar Foreign Minister and his delegation members flew back home after the signing of the agreements at the end of the week-long visit marked by intensive negotiations on the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees.

### Refugees' Reluctance

92AS1019B Dhaka *THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER*  
in English 30 Apr 92 pp 1, 12

[Text] Cox's Bazar, Apr 29: As Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed on repatriation of Rohingyas, scare haunted the camps here with many saying they would prefer remaining refugees to going back to their "disturbed homes" to suffer further persecution, reports UNB.

Refugees, asked at random in the camps Sunday-Monday, expressed the anguish and unwillingness to return home without permanent guarantee to peace and dignity and end to humiliation, torture, rape or loot by Myanmar troops and their collaborators.

"I will not go... my husband was killed by the troops, they raped me in front of my children," said Sanjida Khatun, a 20-year-old mother of three children, sheltered in Dechua Palong camp.

Nur Alam (48) of the same camp, who introduced himself as an activist of interned Burmese opposition leader Aung Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), said unless all civil and political rights of Rohingyas are restored in Burma, they would not go back.

"In 1978, we went back after an agreement, but again we had to leave our homeland... this time we want a guarantee that we won't be refugees ever again."

Alam proposed international observers must be stationed in Arakan at least for 10 years to oversee the attitude of the Myanmar government to the Rohingyas.

When the talks on repatriation were in progress in Dhaka, more and more Rohingyas were crowding the already crammed camps.

Officials here said the rate of influx slowed down for a few days immediately after Ramadan when U.N. envoy Eliasson visited Bangladesh, but it has again increased.

According to official figures, at least 2,000 refugees have been coming a day for the last fortnight, making the relief operation more and more difficult everyday.

Meanwhile, with the monsoon approaching, officials expressed concern about a possible mess in the camps habitation and health situation as soon as rain starts.

Until Sunday, a total of 225,620 Rohingyas crossed into Bangladesh. Only 133,412 could be given shelter, officials said.

Serious trouble will be with the refugees, who are squatting on the ground under almost open sky, during rains.

Doctors in the camps expressed deep concern about any possible eruption of waterborne killer diseases like diarrhea in an epidemic form in camps during monsoon.

The situation is not yet much apprehensive, but it may turn for the worse during monsoon as most refugee children are already suffering from acute malnutrition and have little resistance, said Helen, a French nurse working in MSF (France) health center in Holdia refugee camp.

The government has recently requested ICDDR.B [expansion not given] to immediately open a diarrhea clinic in Cox's Bazar refugee camp area.

UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] Representative Mitchel Carlson said at least an additional 200 shelters need to be arranged everyday, which is a very difficult task.

"We have to give shelter to all the refugees before rain... it's a race against the time," Carlson said.

But officials in Cox's Bazar relief control room said suitable land for setting up camps was very scarce now.

Scarcity of sources of water has been a major obstacle to setting up new camps.

### UNHCR Welcomes

BSS adds: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on Wednesday welcomed the joint communique agreed by both Bangladesh and Myanmar

governments on Tuesday incorporating the principles of voluntary and safe return of Myanmar refugees from Bangladesh.

The UNHCR, however, expressed its concern at the continued arrival of refugees from Myanmar into Bangladesh. It stressed the immediate improvements in conditions from which the influx originates and said, "confidence building measures are indispensable for ensuring a voluntary and safe return."

The UNHCR noted the recognition given by both parties of the role that UNHCR could play in various stages of the repatriation process.

The UNHCR reiterated its willingness to engage in consultations with both governments to help ensure a genuinely voluntary and safe repatriation within a realistic time frame.

#### Aid for Refugees

Another report adds: The Commission of the European Committees has approved an additional emergency aid grant of Taka 4.80 crore (one million Ecu) to provide humanitarian assistance to the Myanmar Muslim Rohingya refugees, an EC [European Community] press release said in Dhaka on Wednesday.

The grant was approved following an appeal by the UNHCR and the continuing influx of Rohingyas into Bangladesh.

The grant is being used by the UNHCR (700,000 ECU) to support the government's shelter construction programme. CARE (120,000 ECU) to improve the sanitation in the refugee camps and Gonoshasthaya Kendra (180,000 ECU) for the construction of 2000 shelters.

The new grant brings the Commission's total assistance for the Rohingya refugees to Taka 9.60 crore (two million ECU).

#### Ershad Indicted for Janata Tower Handling

92AS1031A Dhaka *THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER*  
in English 23 Apr 92 pp 1, 10

[Text] The F.I.R.[First Information Report] in the case states that two plots of commercial land at Kawran Bazar was put up for auction by Rajuk in September 1985, but finding the bid not up to the mark, the authorities decided not to dispose of the land, rather construct a building of its own. Subsequently Rajuk went for reauction. Some bidders in the first bid brought court order stopping the process. One Sakur Pradhan (one of the highest bidders) and 12 others claiming themselves as affected owners appealed to the then President H.M. Ershad on 26 August 1989 to lease the two plots in their favour at the rate of Taka 1,93,550 per katha.

The charge said a day after their prayer, Ershad ordered Rajuk to allot the plots to the applicants and accordingly Rajuk allocated two plots among the applicants, dividing

them into four groups. It said Md Shahinoor Islam and two others were given 12 katha land at Taka 23,22,600, which they deposited on 18 September 1989, and on the following day, the land was handed over. A day after the lease deed was completed on 21 September 1989, the leasees sought Rajuk's permission to sell the plot to Janata Publishing Company Ltd. at Taka 33 lakh. Rajuk approved the prayer on 25 September 1989 and the sale deed with Janata was performed on 2 November 1989. The charge said Ershad, by misusing his official position, brought benefit to the tune of Taka 4 crore to Raushan Ershad and others.

The F.I.R. further charged by awarding the two plots (numbering 49 and 49 at Kawran Bazar Commercial Area) measuring 2.1 bigha at reduced price, Rajuk, sustained a loss amounting to Taka 5,48,70,900.[as published]

Raushan Ershad co-accused in the case, was charged in the F.I.R. of receiving Taka 1,80,00,000 as graft in the deal for 12 Katha plot. It said that though the price of land (12 katha plot) was shown at Taka 33 in the document, Begum Raushan Ershad did not pay a single taka to those who have been shown to have sold the land.

Khandakar Mahbubuddin appearing on behalf of Ershad said his client made no crime by recommending Rajuk to give land to some affected people. About the new charge, he said it was a revelation to him, and said as per law, the attorney was supposed to get notice and eligible to see the necessary papers. Unless papers are provided, answers to the charges could not be submitted, Khan-dakar, Mahbubuddin said.

Mr. Sharfuddin Ahmed Mukul, defending Raushan Ershad, said his client was not responsible for allotment of land and that she is a bona fide purchaser to construct a multistoried building for the company of which she is the Chairman.

Mr. M.A. Malek, appearing on behalf of Mr. Rahmatullah, also demanded papers to present his case.

Former President H.M. Ershad was indicted on Wednesday of possessing Taka 6.5 crore, which he paid for the construction of a multi-storied building for Janata Publishing Company limited on a plot of land earlier, allegedly transferred illegally under his directive, reports BSS.

Submitting charge proposals in the case against Ershad and 19 others, Attorney General Aminul Haq stated that the principal accused (Ershad) paid Taka 10 crore construction of the building that included Taka 3.5 crore received as loan from Uttara Bank against the plot. [sentence as published] The Attorney General said Taka 6.5 crore received by Nirman International, the construction firm from Ershad was found to be disproportionate to the income of the accused as a public servant. The accused, by this act, had committed an offence under Section 5(1)(E) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947, he said.

25 June 1992

## SOUTH ASIA

This is the second case against Ershad for possession of money or wealth beyond his known sources of income. The building mentioned is popularly known as Janata Tower which was constructed on a plot of land measuring 12 katha in Kawranbazar area of the city. The first charge sheet against Ershad was misusing his official position and working in collusion with others to provide Taka 4 crore of benefit to that extent to his wife Raushan Ershad alias Begum Raushan Ara, a coaccused in this case and others. Raushan Ershad is the Chairman of Janata Publishing Company.

While mentioning about a supplementary charge sheet in the case and evidence found to that effect, the Attorney General said prosecution are in possession of documentary evidence that Nirman International received Taka 6.5 crore from Mr. Ershad. [sentence as published] He said as such the accused is punishable under Section 5(2) of Act II of the Anti-Corruption Act of 1947, which is within the cognizance of this court.

It was the second appearance of Begum Raushan Ershad in the court of Special Judge Md. Ismail Miah, the case numbering 11 of 1992, and Wednesday was fixed for charge hearing. Hearing remained incomplete and the charge will be framed after hearing both sides. The Judge fixed 28 April as the next date of hearing.

In the first case of disproportionate income, Ershad was sentenced to 3 years simple imprisonment. During that time, it was established that Mr. Ershad's wealth and possession earned during his life time was around Taka 73 lakh.

Former Chief Whip and Minister M.A. Sattar and former Chairman of RAJUK M.M. Rahmatullah are the two other important accused persons in this case in which 33 persons have been named as prosecution witnesses. Three accused persons remained absconding.

On a prayer, the Judge allowed one Md. Sekender Hossain to leave the court to attend the burial of his grandfather at Chandpur.

Ershad and Raushan, who sat side by side outside the dock, were found whispering among themselves during the mealy two-hour proceeding. Earlier, Ershad lent a helping hand to his ailing wife in entering the court. Raushan's attending physician said she has many complications including swollen legs caused by increased acidity (uric acid).

The F.I.R. in this case was filed on 14 April 1991 and charge sheet submitted on 7 September 1991. A supplementary charge sheet was also submitted later.

Defence attorneys rose one after another to take part in the hearing, but stated that they cannot make submission without getting all documents and papers. They also said that the Attorney General had mentioned new points which stunned them. The Attorney General had brought accusation beyond the F.I.R. and the charge sheet, attorneys pointed out.

In his reply, Attorney General Haq said he was not bound by mere F.I.R. and charge sheet for the indictment. He said charge could be framed in accordance with evidence collected by police and other investigating agencies, and added that the court was also not bound to go by F.I.R. and charge sheet in framing charges.

The Attorney General said the court is free to draw its inference of the offence committed by accused persons and frame charge accordingly. He mentioned that copies of CS [Charge Sheet] F.I.R. and statements of witnesses have been given to defence attorneys who asked for them. About the new charge brought today, he said since he did not make any formal submission, he was not bound to provide copy.

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